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Abstract
This paper argues that the relation between temptations and the level
of consumption plays a key role in explaining the observed behaviors of
the poor. Temptation goods are defined to be the set of goods that gen-
erate positive utility for the self that consumes them, but not for any
previous self that anticipates that they will be consumed in the future.
We show that the assumption of declining temptations, which says that
the fraction of the marginal dollar that is spent on temptation goods de-
creases with overall consumption, has a number of striking implications for
the investment, savings, borrowing and risk-taking behavior of the poor,
which would not arise if temptations were either non-declining or entirely
absent. Moreover the predicted behaviors under the declining temptation
assumption can help us explain some of the puzzling facts about the poor
that have been emphasized in the recent literature.
JEL Codes D03, D91, 012
1 Introduction
The poor often behave as if they are very myopic. For example, they borrow
repeatedly at extremely high interest rates, 1 which, at least under the standard
*We are grateful to Doug Bernheim, Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Esther Duflo, David Laibson,
Dilip Mookherjee, Adnana Lleras-Muney, Ben Polak, Matthew Rabin and seminar partici-
pants at BREAD. Cornell, Columbia, Bocconi, Stanford, Warwick, Yale, Princeton, UCLA,
Harvard, MIT, Pornpeu Fabra, Unviversidad Carlos III de Madrid, The Trento Summer School
on Behavioral Economics, and Boston University for extremely helpful comments. We are par-
ticularly grateful to Daniel Benjamin and Ted O'Donoghue for posing challenges on an earlier
draft that led to significant changes in this one and to Arun Chandrasekhar and Emily Breza
for superb research assistance.
'For example, Aleem (1990 j in a survey of money lenders finds an average interest rate
of 78.5% per year. Even formal micro-financial institutions charge extremely high rates. In
model of consumption decision-making, suggests a strong preference for con-
suming today rather than tomorrow. For example, if individuals are consuming
at steady state levels, the Euler inequality
u'(ct) > 6Ru'{c t+i)
implies that 5 < jj , which, if R is high, puts a rather stringent upper bound on
6. Of course, the steady state assumption may be incorrect. Out of steady state,
a high R would be consistent with a 5 close to 1, but only if consumption is
growing fast-in other words, if the poor are rapidly becoming non-poor. This,
however seems counterfactual-for example, Karlan and Mullainathan (2009)
provide evidence that small-time fruit vendors in Chennai. India, pay interest
rates of 5% per day to finance their business, have been doing so for nine years on
average and remain very poor. 2 The same fact is reinforced by evidence from
the investment domain. Estimates of returns to capital for very small firms
suggest high rates of return for divisible investments. (See de Mel, McKenzie,
and Woodruff (2008) on returns to capital in micro-enterprises in Sri Lanka,
Lee, Kremer and Robinson (2009) on returns to holding more inventories in
Kenya, Duflo, Kremer and Robinson (2009) on using fertilizer in Kenya and
Udry and Anagol (2006) on crop choices in Ghana). Once again, the decision
to consume today rather than take up these high return investment activities
suggests a high discount rate.
It is theoretically possible explain these phenomena based on non-standard
assumptions about the form of the utility function, but these alternative ex-
planations do not seem to be particularly empirically plausible. For example,
one could argue that the poor cannot cut back on consumption because they
are against some sort of "minimum consumption" constraint. This, however,
appears implausible given (a) that consumption actually shows substantial high
frequency variation (Collins et. al. (2009)) and (b) the direct evidence (see
Banerjee and Duflo (2007)) that even the very poor spend a significant part
of their income on what are clearly not survival necessities (cigarettes, alcohol,
expensive but not especially nutritious foods). Another argument is that the
realized discount factor is a consequence of high mortality. The problem is that
death rates for a very poor person at age 30 or 40 is not substantially different
from that of someone richer. A very different alternative is to argue that the
interest rates are not realized because of high default rates. In fact however
default rates for both formal and informal institutions that actually lend to the
Mexico and other countries, for example, prominent micro-finance institutions charge 90%+
per year. The fact that people are borrowing at these rates repeatedly is reported for the
case of agricultural finance by Dreze, Lanjouw and Sharma (1997), the case of daily working
capital by Karlan and Mullainathan (2009) and for payday loan usage in the United States by
Skiba and Tobacman (2007). See Banerjee (2004) for a survey of the evidence of high interest
borrowing in developing countries.
-This example also rules out the possibility that the high interest rate borrowing is simply
emergency borrowing, i.e. borrowing in unusual states of the world when the marginal utility
of consumption is especially high. Much of the litarature on how interest rate borrowing also
emphasizes the fact that such borrowing is entirely routine for many low income borrowers
(see survey of the evidence in Banerjee (2004)).
poor are extremely low (Banerjee (2004)). Default rates for all the lenders in
Aleem's study are below 10% and the median is less than 5%. This is also the
shared experience of Microfinance Institutions.
In this paper, we provide an alternative approach. We builds on a growing
literature which models myopic behavior as part of a broader set of time in-
consistent preferences (Shefrin and Thaler (1981), Laibson (1997), O'Donoghue
and Rabin (1999)) and points out that for many people, myopia about some de-
cisions coexists with being farsighted about others. The poor are no different in
this regard: The same people that borrow at very high rates also engage in vari-
ous far-sighted behaviors, from the purchase of burial insurance to participation
in ROSCAs (Collins et. al. (2009)).
At the core of our model of self-control is the assumption that there are two
types of goods-goods that generate utility both when consumed but also before
they are consumed (i.e. in anticipation) and goods which, to a much greater
extent, generate utility only at the point of consumption. We may take great
pleasure from smoking a cigarette today or eating a whole box of donuts, but
knowing that we will consume them in the future even though they are bad for
us does not make us happy (and indeed, may even serve to get us depressed).
In our framework, the donut or the cigarette represents a temptation good.
In the moment we would spend money on it, But we would like future selves to
not spend money on it. Temptation goods give us utility in the moment but it
is not utility we care for when considering future selves. 3 This is in alternative
to other goods where present and future selves agree: in the moment we spend
on them and we would like future selves to spend on them as well. These are
goods like a good education for our child, our a nice house to retire in.
The link to poverty within this framework comes from assuming that the
fraction of the marginal dollar that is spent on temptation goods can depend
on the level of consumption. In particular we distinguish between the case
where temptation is declining in the sense that the above-mentioned fraction
goes down as total consumption goes up and the case where it either stays the
same or goes up (the non-declining temptation case). We postpone a more
detailed discussion of why temptation might be declining (or not) till the next
section. However one motivating example might help to see why temptations
do not have to scale with income: Suppose that donuts that cost SO. 25 form a
visceral temptation that tempt all people equally. Giving in to this temptation,
however, has different budgetary impacts for the rich and the poor. The $0.25
will be far more costly to someone living on $2 a day than to someone living on
$30 a day. In other words, the same self-control problem is more consequential
for the poor. This example generalizes even if the rich face new temptations
so long as the temptations they face do not rise proportionally with income,
which may be the case, for example, because temptation goods are better at
satisfying primitive consumption urges-fat, sugar, and other visceral pleasures-
than other forms of consumption. It is not implausible that such urges may
3 As discussed below, a very similar formulation can arise from a model of family decision-
making with divergent preferences.
(after a certain wealth level) be easily satisfied and that further expenditure is
unlikely to produce much more pleasure. 4 As a practical matter, donuts can
only get so expensive (and even then only gain very little in "temptingness").
When the availability of temptations do not increase proportionally with income,
then the poor will spend a bigger share of their marginal dollar on "temptation
goods" 5
Of course in the end, whatever assumption we make about the shape of
temptations must be judged by how well it fits the data. The main point of this
paper is that the assumption of declining temptation has a number of striking and
novel implications that are relevant to understanding the savings, credit, risk-
taking and investment choices made by the poor and how the poor get treated in
asset markets. This contrasts with the case of non-declining temptation, where
the standard intuitions mostly continue to hold, despite the fact this is a model
that allows for self-control problems in the decision process,
To formalize these idea that some goods are more tempting than others, we
expand the standard hyperbolic model-which focuses on time inconsistency in
the level (not composition) of consumption ct arising from discount factors which
vary by horizon-to consider the case where there are two goods. Consumption
Ct has two components; x t and zt - The first, Xt, reflects consumption spending
on which there is no temptation: x t has prospective value for all periods s < t.
The second, zt , reflects consumption where there is temptation; only the t self
values zt , i.e. there is no prospective valuation of z consumption. We refer to x
as a non-temptation good and z as a temptation good. 7
Interestingly, time inconsistency now arises even without horizon-varying
discount factors. Simply allowing the different goods to have different discount
rates already produces time inconsistency because these different discount fac-
tors generate disagreement over the two selves about the composition of con-
sumption. In other words, our framework extends the logic of the hyperbolic
model to the case of multiple goods-with an emphasis on good-specific rather
than horizon-specific discount factors. 8
In fact data from India on spending on oils, fats and sugars in fact suggests that while
they are an increasing share of food expenditures, they are actually a decreasini/ share of total
expenditures (see for example Subramanian and Deaton (2006)).
5 Of course some might argue that at least a part of the lack of self-control is intrinsic
to being poor: perhaps lack of health or human capital investments at an early age reduces
development of the facility of self-control. For example, Becker and Mulligan (1997) pro-
vide a framework to understand the endogenous determination of discount, rates, though not
necessarily self-control. This is however not the approach we take.
6 Experimental evidence for the idea that some goods are more tempting can be found in
among others Read, Loewenstein and Kalyanraman (1999). See also O'Donoghue and Rabin
(2006).
7 Such good-specific temptations could also be captured in a hyperbolic model by allowing
goods to deliver different types of consumption at different points in time (as in Gruber and
Koszegi (2001) on cigarettes). While an excellent framework for understanding situations
where the main issue is the long-run consequences of a good (e.g. health effects), such an
appraoch is less appealing when we are interested purely in how the consumption of temptation
goods affects savings etc.
8 In Section 4.2, we examine in what way a more standard hyperbolic model, without
consideration of good-specific discount factors, could generate income-dependent self-control
This disagreement over composition also generates disagreement over the
level of consumption. Formally, consumption choices in this model are deter-
mined by a modified Euler equation:
u'{x t)=5Ru'{xt+l )[l-z'{ct+l )]
where z(c) quantifies the amount of total consumption that goes to temptation
goods. So spending tomorrow is subject to a "temptation tax": a dollar spent
tomorrow is partly dissipated on temptation goods. Since today's self does not
value tomorrow's temptation spending, any temptation spending tomorrow is a
waste. As a result, today's self would prefer to consume more today rather than
save, producing what appears to be a high discount factor. 9
A number of conclusions follow directly from this simple equation and the
reasoning that goes into it. For example, it can explain why the poor may much
appear much more patient in the purchase of durable goods than in their savings
decisions, and why "sin" taxes may have undesirable effects on decision-making
by the poor. However the most important value added of our framework comes
from being able to precisely define what we called the declining temptation case:
This is the case where z'(c) is decreasing and hence z(c) is concave. The paper
is primarily about the implications of this assumption, some of which are listed
below
First, it is evident from the Modified Euler Equation and the fact that z(c)
is concave, that if we use the traditional Euler equation to back out discount
factors, the poor will appear to be more myopic than the non-poor even if they
are not. 10 What appears to be myopic behavior amongst the poor is as much a
result of their poverty as it is a cause.
Second, a concave temptation tax alone can generate a behavioral poverty
trap. In this case, there will exist a critical initial wealth level w > such that
long run consumption discontinuously jumps up around w. Those individuals
with wealth just below w will save very little or dissave, while those who are
slightly wealthier will save a lot more. Note that this poverty trap arises even
though we have no lumpy investments or even credit constraints, the usual
ingredients of models of poverty traps. Intuitively, in our model, individuals
face an added incentive to save because if they get richer, the temptation tax
goes down. On the other hand, at low enough wealth, this added incentive
is offset by the level of the temptation tax. Put another way, the moderately
well-off can save in the hopes of being sufficiently wealthy to avoid a large tax.
The poor cannot save enough to accomplish this (or in a multi-period model it
would take them too long do so); hence they simply dissave. People are present-
biased because they are poor, but that in turn keeps them poor. More generally,
giving people some reason to be hopeful about the future makes them act more
factors.
9 In our formal model, the temptation tax is central. Our model could be reinterpreted also
as arising from some family-conflict models. We do not attempt to make a distinction from
this interpretation.
10 In the economics literature, the fact that the poor appear ro be myopic was remarked
upon as early as Irving Fisher (1932).
forward-looking in the present, which might actually end up partially justifying
the hope (this therefore has the flavor of an aspiration effect (Ray (2002)). This
effect and hence the poverty trap cannot exist under non-declining temptations.
Third, a concave temptation tax affects individuals' responses to uncertainty:
Individuals may hold very little buffer stock savings relative to the shocks they
face. This is because they fear that the future selves will spend liquid savings on
temptation goods. The model also has surprising implications for precautionary
savings behavior: an increase in variance can actually reduce precautionary
savings. This is true even if the utility functions (both u(x) and v(z)) exhibit
prudence.
Fourth, investment behavior in this framework will be constrained not just
by returns and the minimum admissible scale associated with the project, but
also by the maximum possible scale: a small high return investment may not be
as attractive as a larger opportunity with lower returns. This, we feel, can help
explain phenomena such as why individuals fail to undertake very high return
non-lumpy investments that are available to them (we already mentioned Duflo,
Kremer and Robinson's work on fertilizer and Lee, Kremer and Robinson's re-
search on working capital). Once again this cannot happen as long temptations
are non-declining.
The model also has implications for the demand for credit. While predicting
that there will be a desire for commitment (a cap on loan sizes) as in any
model of time inconsistency with sophistication, it also notes this desire is not
monotonic: people may prefer their future selves to take a bigger loan over a
smaller one if temptations are declining but not otherwise
Finally, this model allows us to think about why, even in the absence of
enforcement problems or asymmetric information, a lender who has full market
power may refuse to finance a borrower who has a profitable investment op-
portunity that generates a net surplus over the cost of capital. Specifically, we
show that given these preferences, monopolistic money-lenders might have the
incentive to deny certain individuals otherwise profitable loans in order main-
tain their power over the borrower. As pointed out by Srinivasan (1979), this is
not possible with standard preferences-nor with non-declining temptations, as
we show. 11
The next section presents our model, explains the modeling of the self-control
problem and derives its basic properties. In particular we derive and the ex-
plain the Modified Euler Equation. The next section presents implications of
the Modified Euler Equation, without introducing the declining temptation as-
sumption. Section 4 introduces, explains and motivates the declining temptation
assumption. Section 5 derives a series of consequences of the declining tempta-
tions assumption and contrasts them with the non-declining temptation case.
Each sub-section of section 5 is an application of this assumption to a differ-
ent problem of saving, investment or credit. Finally, while these results are
qualitative and the primary value of this paper is its ability to deliver a num-
ber implications from a simple assumption, section 6 discusses some potentially
"The idea of trying to formalize this debt trap goes back to Bhaduri (1977).
quantitative tests of the model.
2 Model
2.1 Modeling Temptations
Before setting up the model in full generality, we describe a simple version that
captures the main intuitions. Suppose that an individual lives for two periods
t — 1,2. Each period, he can consume x t and z t , two different components of
consumption. 1 " If individuals were time consistent and had separable utility
functions, they would maximize U(x 1 ) + V(z 1 ) + 6U(x2 ) + 5V(z2 ). The two
goods produce different utility and the two time periods have different value:
today's self favors today over tomorrow. But the two selves agree on how to
weight the different goods. By contrast, in our model, temptation goods are
exactly those goods about which today's self and tomorrow's self disagree. A
stark way to model this is to assume that the period 1 self maximizes
U{x l ) + V{z l )-{-5U(x 2 ).
In other words, he values his own spending on temptation goods but does not
value tomorrow's self's spending on them. One rationale for this is that he-
donic experiences can be multi-dimensional. Some hedonic experiences provide
visceral, immediate pleasures. For example, sugary or fatty foods may provide
such instant gratification. Other experiences provide different more lasting plea-
sures. For example, eating a more healthy meal may provide a sense of fullness
and some pleasurable tastes but not the same instant gratification. If we value
instant gratification more in the moment than we do for future selves, then a
self-control problem arises. 13 Others have argued that the neurological evidence
favors a two-self model in which one self is tempted by visceral pleasures and the
other is focused on longer term consumption (Fudenberg and Levine (2006)).
Our work can be thought of as a particular way to model this disjunction.
A different rationale comes from the nature of social pressures: People often
feel obliged to subsidize certain relatives but take no pleasure in doing so. For
someone who takes no enjoyment in anticipating that she will subsidize a par-
ticular relative in the future, the maximization is exactly the one above, with
money for the relative modeled as a z good. More generally consider a family (or
an extended family) where savings decisions are controlled by one member but
the division of total consumption spending across different goods is negotiated
among the various different constituents. In this case the x good is the part of
total family consumption that the person who is in charge of the savings values,
while the rest is are z goods. We do not aim to distinguish from this form of
family conflict from intra-personal conflicts.
12 Note in what follows these two components will be two different amounts of money spent
on consumption.
13 This interpretation is bolstered by recent neurological research which argues that imme-
diate pleasures and the resulting self-control problem may be localized in different parts of
the brain (see McClure et. al. (2004)).
The particular modeling approach we take offers three main advantages. It
allows us to introduce between-good variation in the extent of the self-control
problem associated with the goods. Second, it allows us to capture the idea
that self-control problems vary by the level of consumption in a very simple
way. Third, it allows us to introduce self-control problems in a two period
model, unlike in the standard hyperbolic discounting model (where individuals
maximize a utility function of the form u(cn) + /3 ^2 t 5 u(ct)).
We do not claim that these ideas cannot be captured in other, more stan-
dard, models of time inconsistency. As we discuss in section 3.1, the idea that
temptations vary with the level of consumption, for example, can be captured
in the hyperbolic discounting framework but the conditions required to get the
property are significantly less transparent than the conditions we need to impose
and therefore harder to judge.
The more general version of our model simply recognizes that when there are
several goods, one can form an index of spending on temptation goods and an
index of spending on non-temptation goods. 1 ' 1 To capture these ideas, suppose
there are n goods consumed in each of two time periods. 15 Denote the amount
consumed of good i = {1, 2 m,m + 1, ....?i} in time t = {1, 2} by x\. At time
2 individuals maximize:
E{U(xl...,x2m )} (1)
where the U is increasing and concave, and E{-} is the expectations operator
defined in terms of the uncertainty in the model, as defined below.
At time 1, we assume individuals have decision utility equal to:
U(x\,
...,xl) + V(x lm+1 , ...,x\) + 8E{U(xl...,x2J} (2)
To understand this utility, it is useful to contrast equation (2) with the equivalent
in a traditional discounted utility model:
U(x\
) ...,xln ) + V(xl+u ...,x ln ) + 5E{U(xl...,xl) + V(x2rn+l ,...,xl)}
The key difference with our formulation is that the term SE{V(x 2n+1 , ...,x„)} is
omitted. Thus for goods i = 1, .., m, the time 1 self uses the same utility function
as the time 2 self and discounts the future by the same rate, 5. However, the
time 1 self places no weight on the utility derived from goods i = m + 1, ...,n
in period 2. Thus, goods m + 1, ...,n, are the goods that the future self values
but which today's self assigns zero weight. We will refer to these goods as
"temptation goods"
.
Considerable simplification is possible if we make use of within period opti-
mization. Choosing units so that all good prices are 1, we define the indirect
utility functions
m
U(xt)= max U(x\,...,x 1m),y^x ti = x t ,t = l,2
xi ...2:-.. *-
—
J
14 In the appendix we consider a model where goods have both temptation and non-
temptation components and in this case the indices are merely a measure of the dollars spent
on temptations.
15 This setup can be obviously extended to more periods.
and
n
V{z t ) = V{x2m+1 ,...,x2n ) max , V x\ = z\
The key insight is that the total amount spent on any subset of goods must be
spent optimally within that subset, even when the consumer is actually deciding
over a larger set. We can therefore write the above maximand in the compact
form
U{x l ) + V(z l )+5E{U{x2 )}. (3)
For most of this paper, this is the utility function we will use. In
essence, x denotes the index of spending on non-temptation goods, while z
denotes the index of spending on temptation goods, much in the same way
that c denotes the spending on total consumption in traditional and hyperbolic
discounting models. 16 That both U and V should be increasing and concave
follows from the corresponding assumptions about U and V. Furthermore we
will assume in everything we do that U is at least three times differentiable
everywhere. We refrain from making the corresponding assumption for the V
function to accommodate certain special cases.
An even more general formulation, which allows all goods to be desired both
for their present and their future value, but with differing weights, is developed
in the appendix. We show that it is possible to construct a U(x) function and
a V(z) function such that the choices made under these preferences are exactly
the same as those made under the original more complicated preferences. This
ought to be intuitive: essentially, x captures the part of the expenditure that
aligns with what the forward-looking self wants, while z is the part that is
wasted from the forward-looking self's point of view, and it should not matter
that the wasted expenditure takes the form of excess spending on goods that
the forward-looking self also values (just not enough to justify that level of
spending).
2.2 Maximization
Individuals maximize this utility subject to their budget constraints. In the
first period they earn a deterministic "labor" income y
1
.
They can save a part
of the income and invest it in some income generation function /(tu 1 ,^) where
w 1 = y
l
— x
l
— z
1
is the amount saved and 9 is some random shock and /(, ) is
the future income generated. We call this an income generation function (rather
than a production technology) because we want to allow for the possibility that
the person may borrow or lend and may invest all or part of the money in a
production technology. Moreover he may or may not be constrained in terms
of how much he can borrow or lend (and at what rates). It is easily checked
that an /(•,•) function that is increasing in w 1 accommodates all these cases.
We will assume, in addition, that /(•, •) is differentiable and concave in w l (but
16 As a result, there are several underlying good-specific utility functions that can generate
the index utility described in (3). Thus while the separable utility formulation in (2) generates
it, other more complicated utility functions can also give rise to it.
not necessarily strictly concave). This rules out poverty traps that arise from
non-convexities in production (as in Galor-Zeira (1993)) or in the credit supply
function (as in Banerjee-Newman (1994)).
In the second period, the person also gets a potentially uncertain "labor"
income y
2 (9'). We assume that 9 and 8 are independent random variables and
that 8' is realized in the second period before consumption decisions are taken.
As defined above, maximizing U{x2 ) + V(z2 ) subject to a budget constraint
x
2 + z2 = c2
,
and the conditions (x 2 > 0,z2 > 0) gives us functions x 2 (c
2
) and
z
2 (c2 ). Under the standard assumption that both U and V are strictly concave,
x
2 (c2 ) and ~ 2 (c2 ) will be non-decreasing in c2 . If V is also differentiable (in
addition to U being differentiable), then x2 (c2 ) and z 2 (c2 ) will be differentiable
and strictly increasing everywhere except perhaps where the non-negativity con-
straint binds. Using the fact that c2 = f(w l ,6) + y 2 {8'), we can write this as
x 2 (f(w 1 ,9) + y2 {9')). Also for future use, define z2 {x 2 ) to be the function that
is defined by the first order condition for maximizing U{x2 ) + V(z 2 ) subject to
a budget constraint x2 + z2 — c2
,
i.e. by the equation V'(z 2 ) = U'(x 2 ), and de-
fine W(c) to be the indirect utility function defined by maximizing U{x) +V(z)
subject to a budget constraint x + z = c, and the conditions (x > 0,z > 0).
Since both U and V are increasing and strictly concave, so is W(c).
The decision-maker in the first period is assumed to be sophisticated and
therefore takes this function into account in making his first period choices. We
assume that in the first period he gets an income/endowment y 1 .
Therefore in the first period, the decision problem is to maximize
U{x 1 ) + V(z l ) +SEe
,
,{U(x 2 (f(w\Q) +y\0')))}
subject to
and
W l = yl - ,T 1 _ ~1
x
1 >0,z l > 0.
2.3 First order conditions
If an interior optimum exists and x lijfffi g',
' and
d :\
'
exist at the optimum,
then the following conditions must hold.
^(x 1 )A =
A =
dx 1
dV(z l )
dz l
f
dU{x2 {f(w\6)+y 2 {e')))
X
=
6Ee
'
e>{
dx~2
dx 2 (f(w l ,6)+y2 (6'))df(w 1 ,d)
df{w\6) dw 1
o
2
= f(w\6)+y 1 -x l -z l
10
}
When the differentiability condition fails something similar holds with appro-
priately defined left-hand and right-hand derivatives.
These conditions can be rewritten in the more compact form:
dUjx 1 ) dV{z l )
dx 1 dz l
!
dU(x 2 (c2))df(w\9)dx2 (c2 )
^
dU(x l )5Es
'
9 ' {
~l^ d^ dd^ } = ~dxf- (4)
2.4 The Modified Euler Equation
The condition
SEe
>
B ' { S5 d^ d? }= ~1^- (0)
where c2 (6,d') = f(w 1 ,6) +j/ 2 (#') ought to be reminiscent of the standard
Euler equation in dynamic consumer maximization problems. Indeed, the only
difference comes from the presence of the term x
d^
In our setting the
standard Euler equation would take the form
(
du{x2 (c2 {6,e')))df(w\e)
^
duix 1 )dbje,e>{
-j-o -r-
;
— }
-
dx2 dw 1 dx 1
The difference comes from the fact that there is some "dropped utility"—only
part of the total expenditure on period 2 goods is valued by the period 1 self.
Since —
x^
2
'
—
— and d
™,' are always non-negative and xd^
' < 1, this
has the immediate implication that an observer who uses the modified Euler
equation to estimate the decision-maker's discount factor as if it was the stan-
dard Euler equation (i.e. proxying it by the ratio 5 =
r
du{T i lcife .e'm dJ( ,„i i8) l ),
would think that the person is more impatient than he actually is (5 < 5).
Moreover, it does not matter whether he uses an a; or a z good to estimate
the discount factor since, from the within period maximization —'^ ^j '—"^ =
dv(z 2 (c2 (e,e'))) , dU(x l ) = dV(x
l
)
In essence, the tempted consumer faces a temptation tax: he knows that
future resources will be wasted on consumption that he does not care about-
only a fraction
x
dc
c
t
' of the marginal dollar that he pushes into the future
will be spent exactly as he wants. Sophistication about his own susceptibility
to temptations then leads him to incorporate this tax on spending now and in
particular, pushes him to be less forward-looking than he would be under full
commitment. 17
17
If people were entirely naive about their temptations, many of the effects we emphasize
here would not go through, though it is possible that the mistakes that naive decision makers
make would sometimes have similar consequences. However our reading of the evidence is
that consumers are at least partially sophisticated about their self control problems-for one
they demand commitment devices. Indeed we believe most of our results would go through in
11
While our two period framework makes the derivation of the Modified Euler
Equation easier, the basic insight behind it is very general, and it can be shown
that the T period version of our model, where in each period s the consumer
maximizes
T
£V- s J7(x') +V(zs)
t=s
subject to an intertemporal budget constraint similar to the one above, generates
a necessary condition
dU(xs+1 {cs+l )) df(w 3 ,8) dxs+l {cs+1 ) _ dU{x s )
'
'^
dx s+ l diu s dcs+ l *~ dx s '
which is of course exactly the period s version of the Modified Euler Equation.
3 Implications of the Modified Euler Equation
The focus of this paper, as we say in the introduction, is on the implications
of the declining temptations. However some of the broader implications of the
Modified Euler equation are interesting in themselves, even before we introduce
ideas relating to the shape of temptations and are this subject of this short
section. Some of the intuitions we develop in this section, like those on durables,
can be obtained, albeit perhaps less straightforwardly, from other models of self-
control problems. Others, like the discussion of "sin" taxes, is more unique to
our framework.
3.1 Demand for durables
One implication of the self-control problem that is at the heart of our paper is
that there may be some willingness to pay extra for illiquid durables. To see
this, let's return to our original framework where there were multiple x goods,
each with an associated separable utility function. Assume now that there are
two x goods, xi, which is non-durable and xi, which represents a durable. The
utility from x is u(xx), increasing and concave. On the other hand assume
that each unit of the durable purchased at time 1 pays u^ units of additively
separable x utility in both periods 1 and 2 (constant marginal utility). In this
case, an individual would be willing to pay up to ,*N . (1 + S) in x\ terms for
this one unit; because it is committed x consumption, it is discounted at rate 5.
On the other hand, he will make his savings decision based on a discount rate
5(1 — z'(ct )). In other words, people appear to be more patient when we try to
infer their patience from their purchases of durables than if we focus on their
somewhat modified versions if people were partially sophisticated in the sense that they have
moments of lucidity when they see their self-control problems clearly and try to act on them.
Examining these conjectures about partially sophisticated consumers analytically is left for
future work.
18 Proof available from the authors. The only important caveats have to do with the differ-
entiability of the xs (c") function.
L2
generic savings decisions. In other words, people who seem too impatient to
save even at high interest rates may still invest in consumption durables. The
logic is simple: income is taxed by temptations, consumer durables provide an
implicit commitment to x consumption. 19
3.2 Demand for commitment
Empirical evidence suggests that individuals may be interested explicitly in
commitment devices. Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2004) provide a very nice il-
lustration of this. They show that individuals who already have bank accounts
take up and utilize a second "SEED" account whose primary advantage is illiq-
uidity: individuals cannot withdraw deposits at will but can only do so when a
(personally set) predetermined date or target amount is reached.
Demand for commitment savings accounts is a natural consequence of self-
control problems. Understanding the exact structure of this account however,
requires an additional analytical step, In our model with constant tempta-
tions and a concave production technology, the ideal commitment device is
one which provides maximal consumption smoothing. On the other hand the
SEED accounts only permit withdrawals either when the amount in the ac-
count reaches a certain level or after a certain fixed date. In particular 70% of
savers set date-based goals and pick dates like Christmas, someone's birthday
or graduation. The most obvious way to make this consistent with consumption
smoothing within our model is to assume that these are times when the value of
non-temptation consumption ( v',\
x
.\ ) is particularly large, which would imply,
interestingly, that spending on festive occasions and "parties" is not temptation
spending.
Amount-based goals, on the other hand, are naturally understood as an
implication of the declining temptation assumption that we will introduce in
the next section: To make sense of this case, we need to assume that there is
relatively less temptation when the amount being spent is larger. Absent such
an assumption, it is unclear why individuals would value transforming small
amounts of cash into a large amount. Relatedly there is now a literature that
argues that ROSCA's should be interpreted as a way to commit to save (Gugerty
(2007) and Basu (2008)). This interpretation makes sense once again only with
declining temptations.
3.3 The effect of "sin" taxes
As we observed, the key element that distinguishes this approach from the
standard Euler Equation based approach to savings is captured by the term
,\ ' . A lower value of xdJ corresponds to a bigger wedge between what
the period 1 self wants and what the period 2 self will choose and therefore less
savings.
19 Note that this relies on our assumption that consumer durables provide additively sepa-
rable utility. To the extent that durables provide utility that can be substituted for by future
consumption choices, they would provide less commitment value and be demanded less.
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In this environment, suppose the government announces a tax on goods like
cigarettes and alcohol, which is what is typically called a "sin" tax, and assume
that these are also temptation goods as we have denned them (i.e. z goods).
What is the effect of such a tax on ^ ' and hence on savings, etc.?
To introduce the idea of a tax, let the price of z goods in terms of x goods
be denoted by p. However since the price of x goods is still "one" in both peri-
ods, the Modified Euler Equation is unaffected by this change and the effective
discount factor is still determined by j£ < . To study the effect of a "sin" tax
we want to know how an increase in p in period 2, affects ,\ ' .
To get at this, observe that the within second period budget constraint
should now be written as x2 +pz2 = c2 . As a result, the allocation of c2 between
x 2 and z2
,
will be determined by the condition
dU{x2 ) dV[z2 )
P- dx2 dz 2 '
Differentiating this condition with respect to c2
,
gives us:
,*V)g - KV)g
where U" and V" are the second derivatives of U and V, and from the budget
constraint we have that
dx2 dz 2
-d^ +P dc^
= l -
Solving these two together we get
dx 2 2 U"{x2)dx 2
+ P*dc2 r V"{z 2 ) dc2
which tell us that
dx 2 1
dc2 i | „2 C/"(z
2
) i | R,, yU'(* 2 ) pz 21 ^ f V"(z2 ) L T R v V"(;2) x 2
where Ry and Ry are the coefficients of relative risk-aversion corresponding to
U and V at x 2 and z 2
. Since p
v,^i) = 1, and x
2
= c
2
- pz 2 this simplifies to
dx~ 1
dc2 1 + §Rv c'2 -pz 2
Now assume that both U and V represent CRRA utility functions, though the
coefficients of risk aversion do not have to be the same. Then the only place p
enters the expression for ~j is through the term E£ . It follows that a sin tax
(which raises p) will reduce savings in this model as long as the demand for z~
is less than unit elastic (so that pz 1 goes up when p goes up).
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It has long been argued that "sin" taxes tend to be regressive. Here we
suggest that they may also increase the level of present bias in people's choices
and therefore possibly also affect savings behavior. The key insight is that
sin taxes in this model have two effects. On the one hand they can reduce the
amount spent on the temptation good. This makes sense if the temptation good
has intrinsic ill effects-such as long run health consequences-something we do
not have in our model. On the other hand they can also increase temptation
good's share of expenditure and thereby generate effects on savings.
4 The Shape of Temptation
The key new idea in our framework is that temptation might have a specific
shape. This shape of the temptation is captured by the shape of the z(c) (or
x(c)) function. The next result shows that for any given U(x) function, the z(c)
function can in principle take any shape that we happen to pick for it, as long
as it is increasing, non-negative and z(c) < c.
Proposition 1 Assume that the U function is known and fixed. Let z(c) and
x(c) be a pair of non-negative valued, strictly increasing functions defined on c £
[0, C] for some C > 0, such that z(c) +x(c) = c. Then there exists an increasing,
differentiable and strictly concave function V defined on [0,z(c)} such that the
assumed z(c) andx(c) functions are the result of maximizing U (x) +V (z) subject
to a budget constraint x + z = c, and the conditions (x > 0, z > 0)
Proof. Define the function g(z) = x(h(z)) where the function h(z) is the inverse
of the function z(c),which exists because of the strict monotonicity of z. Then
define
V(z)= [~U'(g(y))dy
Jo>
Clearly V'(z) = U'(g(z)) > 0. It is concave because when z increases g(z)
increases and U'(g{z)) decreases.
Note that we did not require that z(c) be differentiable, and for that reason,
V may not be twice differentiable.
With this result in hand, the rest of the paper studies the implication of
different shapes for the z(c) function in the model of consumption and savings
introduced above. The key distinction, it turns out, is between z'(c) decreasing
and z'(c) constant or more generally, non-decreasing. Constant z'(c) means
that irrespective of income, individuals face the same tax. Since ;(0) = 0,
this means that the availability (and utility) of temptation goods scales linearly
with the consumption bundle. Decreasing z'(c) on the other hand means that as
individuals consume more, temptations are a smaller fraction of consumption:
;1^ is declining with income.
L5
4.1 Declining and non-declining temptations
The key advantage of our framework is precisely its ability to easily capture
temptations that vary with the level of income and in particular, the declining
temptation case. In the Modified Euler Equation (5), the temptation tax is em-
bodied by d£ ' = 1— d£ ' : for every dollar spent,. j£
'
is the tax imposed
by the period 2 self. Whether the tax declines with overall consumption there-
fore depends on whether ~d^
' decreases or increases with income. Specifically
if j£ ' decreases with total consumption, that is to say if z 2 {(?) is concave,
the impact of the tax decreases as consumption rises. Put differently, this offers
an intuitive way to model the idea that self control problems scale slower than
incomes. In the rest of the paper we will contrast this case which we will call the
diminishing temptation case (DTC) with the alternative case where temptation
does not decline ( d \
' is constant or increasing with c2 ) which we will call
the non-diminishing temptation case (NDTC). Note that NDTC includes the
case where ~ 2 (c2 ) = 0, i.e. there are no temptations. Obviously there are many
other cases where z2 is neither convex nor concave everywhere which fall into
neither of these categories. Our results would then apply for local changes in
incomes/consumption but not otherwise.
What, does it mean for ~2 (c2 ) to be concave? The following result offers an
alternative and perhaps more intuitive characterization:
Proposition 2 Assuming that V and U are three times differentiable every-
where and z (c ) is twice differentiable everywhere. Then z 2 {c ) is strictly
(weakly) concave everywhere if and only ifV(x 2 ) = V(z2 (x2 )) is a strict (weak)
concave transform ofU(x 2 ).
Proof. In appendix.
In other words our condition is equivalent to assuming that V is more concave
than U in this specific sense. So, for example, if both of them are CRRA, then
we are asking the coefficient of relative "risk-aversion" on V to be greater than
that on U.
Why should we believe that ~ (c ) is concave or equivalently V is more
concave than U? It is probably worth saying to start out that to simplify the
exposition we are ignoring the one obvious case where this assumption probably
fails-that is for the people who are at the margin of starvation. For those people
it is plausible that the first units of an x good like nutritious food are probably
much more valuable than anything else, and for that reason it is natural to think
of z 2 (c2 ) being convex around zero consumption. By ignoring this possibility we
are focusing on people who are slightly above the starvation threshold. For such
people there are a number of arguments for why ~ 2 (c2 ) should be concave. °
The first is based on the idea that most temptations are essentially visceral,
reflecting desires that are rooted in our physiology (things like the the desire
-"Which amounts to saying that the overall z 2 (c2 ) function is probably S-shaped, with
point of inflexion near zero.
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for sex, the craving for sweets and the love of fatty foods), and for that reason,
relatively insensitive to the variety and range of quality that modern market
economies offer (this should be true, for example, if the relevant physiological
structures evolved in a world where the set of consumption choices was quite
limited). As a result it is hard to spend a lot of money on temptation goods
without hitting satiation.
Second, a lot of the goods that people look forward to owning tend to be
indivisible and therefore relatively expensive (televisions, means of transporta-
tion, a house). In other words, a lot of the most attractive x goods are only
available to those who can spend enough on them, whereas z goods are usually
divisible and therefore available to everyone. Therefore it is possible to spend
much larger amounts on x and still not reach satiation. 21
Third, for the family decision-making example suggested above, it may be
easier for a rich person to say no to a relative who wants a few hundred dollars
for starting a new business, than for a poor person to refuse one who wants just
a couple of dollars for a meal. 22
Finally one can make the case that for most really expensive goods, like
a sports car or a house, are not really available for an impulse purchase in
the same sense in which a cup of sugary tea or a trinket is—there are always
multiple options that need to be examined and weighed, and processes to go
through (have someone check out the deed for the house, inspection) and all
of that ensures that there is time for reflection and reconsideration. In other
words, there is a stage in the purchase of a house or a car that involves paying
a cost now (talk to lawyers, arrange credit) for a future benefit. In this sense
they have to be in part x goods.
In any case, whether this assumption holds is an empirical question. One
tantalizing piece of evidence comes from Deaton and Subramanian's (1996) work
on food expenditures. They show that in rural Maharashtra, the poorest decile
of rural households spends 12.2% of their total expenditures on sugar, oils and
fats. These are goods that could plausibly be thought to have some temptation
component 23 (or at very the least to have more temptation value than cereals
or pulses). For the richest decile, who are also by no means rich, even by Indian
standards, this number is 8.7%. While there surely are other temptation goods,
''Note that this is not inconsistent with U(-) being concave. Formally we assume that
there are a continuum of indivisible x goods indexed by k, such that good x k costs x{k) and
generates utility u(x(k)). We then define U(x) = maxtfufn), x(k) < x) to be the utility from
x expenditures. It is easy to specify conditions under which U(x) will be concave. Of course,
our framework could be extended to the case where the U(x) function is in fact non-convex
(which would be the case if there only a few isolated goods that are worth buying) but our
results do not rely on the non-convexity. Also see the discussion of non-convexities in the next
section.
22 It is true that there is a countervailing force: The richer the person is, the more relatives
probably descend on him, and even all his is willing to give them is a few pennies, they do
add up. However the point when the list of everyone who can legitimately make a claim on
him cannot take too long to be exhausted, and thereafter the fraction of the marginal dollar
going to them will diminish.
23 In Section 6 we return to the central issue of how one might be able to determine which
goods are temptation goods.
17
this declining fraction illustrates our core assumption. Another interesting cat-
egory is leisure, which is plausibly, at least in part, a z good: There is some
evidence that leisure hours decrease with income (Banerjee and Duflo (2007)).
For example, in rural Indonesia, those living at less than a $1 a day work 34.6
hours a week while those living on 2 to 4 dollars a day work 40.8 hours. 24
There are two other ways to test the framework. First, in the next sections we
present a set of direct and testable consequences of s 2 (c2 ) being concave. Testing
them is a way to jointly test our model and this assumption. A second approach,
which we take up in Section 6 is more direct. We describe how, using household
consumption data and a set of choice experiments, one could plausibly determine
the set of goods that are relatively more tempting. Examining whether these
goods are a decreasing share of the budgets of the rich allows us to directly test
the assumption that ~ 2 (c2 ) is concave.
4.2 Relation to hyperbolic discounting
There are two distinct ways to understand how this model is related to the
hyperbolic discounting model. The first is to start with the hyperbolic dis-
counting model and to extend it to the case of two goods. A simple model
with two goods and good-specific hyperbolic discounting assumes that the first
period self maximizes
U{x l ) + f35U(x 2 ) + /3<52 L/(x 3 ) + Viz 1 ) + p'W(z 2 ) + /3'6 2 V(z 3 ),
while the second period self maximizes
U(x 2 ) + f3SU(x 3 ) + V(z 2 ) + P'5V(z3 ).
Notice that time inconsistency here comes from two sources: The conventional
hyperbolic effect, captured by the fact that the weight that period 2 self puts
on period 3's consumption (/35 and (3
1
5) is less than the weight that period 1
would like him to place (5 for both goods); but also a new effect, represented
by the fact that while period 2 self places the same weight on U(x2 ) and V(z 2 ),
period 1 self puts unequal weights on them, since /3 is not equal to /3'.25 But
that makes it obvious that to generate time inconsistent behavior we do not
need the third period, since the new effect makes no reference to period 3.
Since we want to emphasize goods specific discount factors in any case, this
offers us a convenient short-cut-we can drop the third period and analyze the
problem in a two period setting. In addition, in the appendix we show that for
specific U and V functions, with three or more periods, we can exactly recreate
the horizon-specific discount factors of the hyperbolic model solely from good
specific discount factors.
Another way to understand how our model relates to the hyperbolic model
is to ask the reverse question. Suppose one did not explicitly model that some
-''While these differences are large, they are obviously not large enough for hours differences
alone to produce the income differences.
25 There is a third effect, which is the equivalent of the second effect in period 3.
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goods are more tempting than others. Instead, suppose one asks directly in
a standard hyperbolic model "What condition generates greater time inconsis-
tency for the poor?" In other words, what is the analogue of the declining tax
for the hyperbolic discounting model?
To answer this question we need a model with three periods, since the hy-
perbolic part only kicks in when there are more than two periods. Therefore let
the decision maker maximize
U( Cl )+p6U(c2)+P52 U(c3 )
subject to the budget constraint
Cl + Co + c3 = w.
26
As is well-known (from Harris-Laibson (2001) for example), the optimal con-
sumption path for this decision-maker is characterized by the following first
order condition
U'{d) = /35U' (c2 )[l - (3c'2 (iv2 )}
where c2 (w2 ) is defined by the second period decision maker's first order condi-
tion
U'(c2 (w2 )) = PSU'{iu2 -c2 )
and w2 = w — c.\
.
The equivalent of what we called the tax before is the term 1 — j3c'2 (w2 ). We
are interested in the conditions under which (^(wo) is decreasing in w2 . From
the second period decision-maker's first order condition,
06U"(c3 )
Co I Wo) = ' .21
-' U"(c2 )+f36U"(c3 )
Differentiation again yields
c2 (w2 )
=
^(C2 ) + W"(C3)] 2 {^
W(C3)(1 - 4(^ ))[^ (C2)+^" (C3)1
-f35U"(c3 )[U'"(c2 )c'2 (w2 ) + /35U'"(c3 )(l - c^(w2 ))}}
(35U"'(c3 )(l - c'2 (w2 ))U"{c2 ) - (36U"(c3 )U'"(c2 )c'2 (w2 )
[U"(c2 )+p6U"(c3 )} 2
It follows that, c'J,{w2 ) < 0, iff [u"''(S^ < fffQffi • The hyPerbolic model
equivalent of U utility being less concave than V utility is a property regarding
how U'"(c) changes relative to the square of U"(c). Not only is this condition
harder to interpret, it is harder to imagine how one would empirically validate
it. In the rest of the paper we therefore focus on good-specific temptations.
3 In other words we assume that the gross interest rate is 1.
1'J
5 Implications of declining temptations
5.1 Attributions of Impatience
A simple observation trivially follows from our key assumption. Recall that
in subsection 2,4 we had denned 5 to be the discount factor that an observer
would (mistakenly) attribute to our decision-maker, if he assumes a model with
no dropped utility. In the case where there is no uncertainty,
Since z 2 is assumed to be concave as a function of c
,
this tells us that those who
are richer, in the sense of consuming more in the second period, will appear to
be more patient to the observer despite the fact that everyone has the same S.
As will be shown later, second period consumption is monotonic in first period
total income, and hence this could also be stated in terms of first period income
(and also in terms of second period income). 27
This framework, therefore, suggests an intuitive re-interpretation of the com-
mon observation that the poor seem to be more myopic than the non-poor that
goes back at least to Irving Fisher (1932). This is a direct consequence of declin-
ing temptations, which, it is worth emphasizing, does not say that the poor are
more tempted. Indeed the amount spent on temptation goods over the lifetime
is strictly increasing in initial wealth; it is just that it takes a smaller fraction
of total consumption to satisfy one's temptations at high levels of consump-
tion, which is why the same failures (giving in to temptations) have greater
consequences when poor. 2S
5.2 Chaining
For simplicity, we have focused on the two-period case, but having two periods
masks a magnification that happens when the horizon is longer. This magnifi-
cation, which we refer to as chaining, is especially important for quantifying the
importance of temptation. Here we add a third period to illustrate this chaining
effect. The model extends to 3 periods in the most obvious way; in addition, to
keep thing simple, we assume that the person starts with an endowment of w\
and can only save at at the gross interest rate of 1.
We solve through backward induction. The third period self simply maxi-
mizes U{xo,) + V{zs) subject to xo, + z3 — 1U3 = w2 — c2 . This defines £3(11)3) =
2:3(^2 — c2 ). The second period self now maximizes 1/(2:2 (^2)) + V{z2 {c2 )) +
5U(x 3 (w2 — C2)), which gives us c2 (w2 ). Given the solution to this problem, the
first period decision maker maximizes
E/(xi(ci)) + Vfafa)) + SU(x2 (c2 (w l -a)) + S2U(x3 (w2 - c2 (Wl - ci)))
- 7 We put it in terms of second period consumption because, as will emerge, first period
consumption is not necessarily monotonic in first period wealth.
- 8 Note that although we do not model it here, one could include a self-control technology
here. In that language, we would say that the poor require greater self-control since they
would need to resist giving into the same temptations more than the rich.
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In deciding how much to consumer, period 1 self trades off utility today from
consumption (U(x\(ci)) + V(sj(ci)) and the future utility that savings would
provide. Define Wu (-) to be this future utility:
Wu (wi - ci) = U(x 2 (c2 (wi - ci)) + 5U{x3 (w2 - c2 (w l - Cj)))
The marginal benefit of savings is given by differentiation:
Wi(Wl - Cl )
= U' (X2)x'2 (c2 )c'2 (w1 - Ci)
+6U'(x 3 )x 3 (c3 )[l-<J2 (w 1 -c 1 )]
= U' (x3)x'3 (c3 ) -
[5U'(x3)x3 (c3 ) - U'(x 2 )x'2 (c2 )}c'2 (w 1 - c x )
where c3 = w2 — c2 (wi — c\).
But from the first order condition for the period 2 self's maximization,
U'(x 2 ) = 5U'{x 3 )x'3 {c3 )
which means the above expression can be rewritten as
W'u (Wl - Cl ) = 6U'(x3 )x'3 (c3 )
-U'(x 2 )(l - X2 (C2))c'2 (lUl - Cl)
Compare this to the case where there is only one future period in the slightly
artificial sense that the period 1 self controls c2 (as well as c\) but not x 2 or x 3 .
In this case, the reward to saving is given by the function
Wu (wi — Ci) = ma.xU(x 2 (c2 ) + SU(x 3 (w2 — c2 ))
From the envelope theorem we have the reward for an extra dollar of saving
in this case is
W^i-ci) = 6U'(x3 )x'3 (c3 ).
Comparing this expression with the previous one makes clear that the reward
for saving is less in the case where the period 1 self faces two independent future
decision-makers than in the case where he faces one.
This is the sense in which there is "chaining" of temptations: the period 1
self is more tempted in the three period case because he knows that the period
2 self is also tempted, and will "waste" some of the resources that reach him
before they get to the period 3 self.
5.3 Consumption smoothing
One of the most robust predictions of the standard model of savings is that an
increase in future earnings (y
2
) that leaves the return on investment unaffected
will reduce today's savings and increase today's consumption (c ). This is the
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direct result of the desire for consumption smoothing, induced by diminishing
marginal utility. An increase in future income generates a desire to spend more
both today and tomorrow. In our model, however, this need not be the case
because there is a natural countervailing force. Notice that as y
2
rises,
-j^
goes up and as a result, the right-hand-side of the Modified Euler equation
could potentially even go up: The increased spending by the future self on x
increases today's self's desire to transfer income to the future and may even
outweigh the effect of diminishing marginal utility.
Proposition 3 Assume that second period income, y 2 , is deterministic. Under
NDTC, consumption today is increasing in future income: 4% > 0. Under DTC
this need not be the case i.e. we might observe^? < over some range of y
2
.
Moreover we will only observe this pattern for people for whom y 1 and y 2 are
sufficiently small.
Proof. Take the Modified Euler equation for this case
xr , r df(w\8)dU(x
2 (c2 (8)))dx 2 (c2 (8))
^ xSEe{
^h^ dx~2 dc^— } = U{x)
where c2 (9) = f(y l — x 1 —z 1 ,8)+y 2 . In the NDTC, for any value of 6 an increase
in y keeping c 1 = x l 4- z l fixed, increases x = c2 {8) and therefore depresses
U' (x 2 (c2 (0))) for every realization of 6. Moreover it either depresses
x £} '
or leaves it unchanged, for every realization of 0. Since ™, ,' is unchanged
for each realization of 8, the left hand side is now less than the right hand side.
Therefore x l has to go up to restore equality, and since U'{x L ) = V'^z 1 ), z l
must follow suit. Therefore a higher y
2 must be associated with a higher c 1 .
In the DTC, i.e. where ^ is increasing, the basic logic is very similar
except that it is no longer obvious that the right hand side goes down. To see
this, take this case where U(x) = log a;. In that case, the product
dU(x 2 (c2 (8))) dx 2 {c2 (8))
dx 2 dc2
1 dx2 {c2 {6))
x 2 {c2 (8)) dc2
'
Whether x l goes up or goes down turns on whether 2 j a i , \
'
is increasing or
decreasing as a function of c2 . A sufficient condition for this is that x 2 (c2 ) is log-
convex for c2 < max0 f(y 1 , 8) +y 2 , where y2 is the ceiling of the relevant range
ofy . It is easy to check that there are log- convex functions that are non-negative
valued and satisfy x (c ) < c2 on any given finite range of c2 . Therefore from
proposition 1 we can find a V(z) function which makes x 2 (c2 ) is log-convex. In
such cases c 1 will be decreasing in y
2
.
Finally it is clear from the argument above that in order for c 1 to be decreas-
ing in y
2
,
x
2 (c2 ) has to be sufficiently convex to outweigh the natural concavity
of the utility function. However since x 2 (c2 ) ts bounded above by c2 , there is
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a limit to how convex x~(c~) can be on a unbounded domain—for large enough
values of c2 , x
2 (c2 ) must be approximately linear. Therefore c 1 can only be de-
creasing in y
2 for sufficiently low values of y
1
and y (since c is increasing in
y
l and y).
This is a striking conclusion. It tells us that those who are sufficiently poor
might actually react to the prospect of future income growth by beginning to
save more. Conversely savings may actually be lower in exactly those times when
cash will be needed the most in the future: faced with falling future incomes,
people may boost consumption. This offers a possible interpretation of the idea
that aspirations matter (Ray (2002) makes the case that economists need to
take aspirations more seriously).
This result can be understood from a different angle, one that offers an
intuition that helps us understand other results below. Consider an individual
with a time-consistent utility function u(c l ) + 6u(c2 ). Suppose however, that
instead of a investment technology that earns f{w l ), he has only access to a
technology that pays a return f(w 1 )x'(f(w 1 ) + y 2 ). Consider now the impact
of an increase in y
2
. There is the usual consumption smoothing motive that
encourages an increase in c . But here, however, there's an additional motive:
the investment technology becomes more attractive: If the latter motive is strong
enough, we might see the opposite of consumption smoothing.
Note that this is a result we could also get from a model where there are no
self-control problems but there are non-convexities in consumption: It comes
from the fact that from the point of view period 1 self, the marginal utility of a
dollar tomorrow goes up when he spends more tomorrow. On the other hand,
when there are self-control problems it can happen absent any non-convexities in
consumption, The same applies to the next two set of results-on poverty traps,
precautionary savings and investment, which are essentially applications of the
logic developed in this section-but not the results in the last two sub-sections,
which are on the supply and demand for credit, where the self-control plays an
essential role.
5.4 Poverty Traps
This link between future income and savings has implications for first period
income as well. First period income determines how much can be left for future
selves. But since the savings invested for future consumption at time 1 (vj 1 ) and
income at time 2 (y
2
) have similar effects, it is clear that a rise in y
1
could, in
principle, have the same effect as an increase in y
2
. If individuals start out with
more income/wealth (which in this model are the same thing), they will be able
to leave more to future selves. But this potentially creates a feedback effect:
more wealth for time 2 means that x' is higher in that period, which creates an
even greater desire to leave wealth to time 2. This feedback effect can be the
source of a poverty trap:
Proposition 4 Assume that there are no shocks i.e. that both 9\ and 8o are
constants. Then as long as we are in NTDC, c~ will be a continuous function
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of y
l
. On the other hand in DTC, there may exist a y 1 , < y 1 < oo such that
c
2 jumps discontin-uously upward at y l .
Before we come to the main result, it is useful to observe that c2 is always
monotonic increasing with respect to y
l and therefore the fact that c2 jumps
upwards if it jumps is automatic.
Lemma 5 c2 is monotonically increasing as a function of y 1 .
Proof, (of Lemma 5) To see this, suppose to the contrary that there exists t/q
and y\ such that c2 (yg) > c
2
{y\) but j/g <Vi- Let the values c
1 corresponding
to this strategy be c 1 (j/q) and cl {y\). Clearly c l {y\) < c l {y\). Now consider
an alternative consumption strategy for the person at j/q where he consumes
c
2
(y\) in the second period and sets Cg = c x (j/g) + i ^ ' , This must be
dominated by what he actually chooses which implies that
W{Zl)-W(c\yD)
< SU(x2 (c2 (y l ))) - 5U(x 2 (c2 (y\)))
Where
W{c) = m&xU{x) + V(c-x)
On the other hand, the person at y\ clearly prefers the pair {cl (y\), c2 {y\)} to
the alternative of consuming c\ = c 1 (yj) - ' R
c
' in the first period and
c"(j/g) in the second. Therefore
W{c\y\))-W{c\)
> &U{x 2 (c2 {yl)))-SU(x 2 {c2 {y\)))
> W(cl)-W(cl (yl))
However since cj - c 1 (^ ) = c l {y {) - c\ =
c2(y
" )
~ e2(i/
'
) andc^i/g) < c l {y\), this
contradicts the strict concavity of W.
Proof, (of Proposition 4) Consider the maximization problem:
U{x l ) + V{zl ) + 5U(x 2 (f(y 1 -x 1 - z 1 ) + j/2 ))
subject to
x
l > 0,; 1 > 0.
As long as we are in NDTC, so that x 2 (c2 ) is weakly concave, the strict
concavity of U(-) and the weak concavity of /(•) (and the fact that these are all
strictly increasing functions) guarantees that U(x 2 (f(y l - x 1 — z 1 ) + y2 )) is a
strictly convex (and decreasing) function of x 1 and z 1 . U(x l ) and Viz 1 ) are also
strictly concave, These conditions together guarantee that we have a strictly
convex maximization problem, which tells us that the maximizers, a; 1 and z
,
are always unique and vary continuously as a function of the parameters of the
problem, y
1 and y 2 . Hence the result.
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In DTC, on the other hand, this may not be true. To simplify the construc-
tion assume that /(y 1 — x 1 — z 1 ) = R{y l — x 1 — « 1 ),with SR > 1. Also set
y
2
= 0.
The way we will analyze this problem is by looking at how c — c 1 behaves as
a function of y
1
. Clearly if c2 is a continuous function of y
1
,
so is c
1 and c2 — c 1 .
Choose an z2 (c2 ) function which is convex (corresponding to the fact that
we are in DTC) such that there exists a c* , oo > c* > 0, with 5R xd2 = 1.
Because 6R xj£ = 1, if c2 (y l ) = c* , then c l {y x ) = c2 (j/ 1 ) = c*. However for
this to be true, x 1 = x2 (c*), must satisfy the second order condition
[/"(x 1 ) + 5R2 U"(x 2 (c*))[^£^} 2 + 5RU'{x^
(?0^ <
Since x l = x2 (c*) and 5R dc
c
,
' = 1, this expression can be rewritten as
:
U'(x 2 {c'))
r 2
U"(x 2 (c*)) .
x2 {c*)
[{X [C
' U'(x 2 (c*))>
i 1^^^)^^}^!)
9 i »\ d
2
x
2 (c")
dc2
— a:
2 (c*) i/ir^2(c-)) 1S *^e coefficient of relative risk aversion of the [/ function and
measures its degree of concavity, c* j'Jj^'.*. is a similar measure of convexity for
x
2 (c*). This condition therefore requires that the x function is not so convex as
to overwhelm the concavity of U.
It is also clear that we can choose the x2 (c2 ) function such that it satisfies
the conditions of proposition 1, but violates the second order condition above
at c~ = c*
.
Which means that the maximization problem has a local minimum
at c": c* cannot be the value of c2 (y
1
) for any y
1
.
Therefore since c2 (y
l
) is an increasing function, either c2 is discontinuous
or c
2
(y
l
)
-^ c < c* as y
1
—
> oo. But the latter case is impossible as long as we
assume that
> £ > for c~ < c
dc2
and
U'(x) —> as x —> oo.
This follows from the fact that if c2 remains bounded above by c, x 1 —> oo as
y
1
— oo, and therefore the right hand side of the modified Euler equation goes
to (because of our assumption that U'(x) —> as x —» oo) while the left hand
side remains bounded away from zero.
It follows that under these conditions, c(j/ 1 ) must have a discontinuity and
"jump over" c*.
This result reinforces the discussion earlier about the myopia of the poor.
Notice that here two individuals with identical discount rates but with different
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initial wealth levels can end up with very different levels of apparent patience:
the initially poor agent will appear to be impatient and the initially rich one
will appear to be patient.
5.5 Precautionary savings
With standard preferences, it is well-known that an increase in income uncer-
tainty in the second period (i.e. a mean preserving spread in the distribution of
j/
2
) will increase savings in a safe asset as long the single-period indirect utility
function exhibits prudence. In our environment the single-period indirect utility
function would be given by
W(c) = m&xU(x) + V{c - x).
x
If we were to assume that there is a safe technology for transferring wealth
across time (f
2 (w l
, 9) = Rw 1 , where R is a constant), the condition for there to
be precautionary savings would be W'"(c) > 0. A sufficient condition for that
is that both U and V have non-negative third derivatives (and at least one of
them is strictly positive).
With our kind of preferences this condition is no longer sufficient. To see
this, recall the modified Euler equation for this case:
f
<fff(s 2 (c2 (fl'))) tfa:V(fl/ )) 1 , ,6REe ' { d^ d^— ] = U {X } '
Following the logic of precautionary savings in the standard model, it is clear
that in this case, a mean preserving spread in c2 will lead to lower x l if the
function
H{c) _
dU(x(c)) dx((c))
dx dc
is convex as a function of c. Taking derivatives twice (assuming differentiability)
we can write
=
d?U(x) dx({c)) 3 cPU(x(c)) d2 x((c)) dx((c)) 2 dU(x(c)) d
3
x((c))
dx3 dc J dx°- dc2 [ dc l dx dc3 '
Several things become clear from this expression. First we do have the standard
precautionary savings effect coming in as long as —jy 's convex as a function
of c : this is captured by the first term in the above expression, which is positive if
—jy is convex. However, there are two additional, potentially countervailing
effects. One comes from the fact that -J^p may not be convex as a function of c.
This is what the last term says. The other comes from the correlation between
£ an^ Xdc wn icn may n°t t>e positive: This is the middle term above.
Indeed under DTC, —dx anc^ d move ul opposite directions when c
goes up and hence the middle term is always negative. This has a very intuitive
explanation: The whole point of precautionary savings is to raise x consumption
levels in the state of the world when c2 is particularly low. But in the DTC,
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x} is particularly low when c is low, and as a result, saving more does not
help very much in terms of raising x consumption in when c is low. Therefore,
the DTC partially defeats the purpose of saving more to protect against low
c
2
states.29 Notice that the discussion so far has presumed differentiability of
x(c). In particular we will focus on the case where there is no poverty trap. Hence
the failure of NDTC consumers to hold precautionary savings is independent of
the poverty trap proposition above.
To summarize, we have the following Proposition:
Proposition 6 Assume that the distribution of y is described by a family
G(y,"f) which has support on [y,y], with increases in the scalar 7 representing
mean preserving spreads in the distribution of y. Define a: 1 (7) to be the optimal
choice of x 1 for each value of 7, and assume that in an open neighborhood 0/7*,
A^-,2: 1 is differentiable as a function 0/7. Define c2 (j/
2
,7) = R{y l —x 1 (y))+y2
and assume that for 7 G AT7 » , the values ofc
2
(y
2
,
/
y) fall into the non-empty in-
terval [c,c\. Then under NDTC, as long as U"'(x{c)) > and ^^ > for
c £ [c,c], for any 7 G AT7 > > 7*, x
1
^) < x 1 (7*), i.e. a mean preserving spread
in the distribution of y~ reduces x 1 . On the other hand under DTC, even if
rf3
^
(
3
c))
> 0, U'"(x(c)) > 0, and V'"(z{c)) > for c G [c,c],it is possible that a
mean preserving spread in the distribution of y raises x 1 .
Proof. The proof that under NDTC, first period consumption goes down when
y~ becomes more uncertain, is exactly the same as the proof of a precautionary
demand for savings as long as the function H(c) = —£} dc ' defined above,
is convex. Prom the expression derived above, this is always true when —
^ 3
>
for c G [c, c]
.
To prove that this condition does not guarantee the same result under DTC,
consider the following example.
Let U(x) = In a; and x(c) be described
x(c) — ac, c < c, < a < 1
x(c) = Ae 13 '2 ,c> c> c
x(c) = 5c — 7, c > c, < 5 < 1,7 >
To ensure x(c) is differentiable, continuous and increasing everywhere, as-
sume that
ac = Ae0£
a = pAeP*
ac = Ae&z - 7
5 = [SAe^
29 On the other hand, the presence of this term also means that in the NDTC, we can get a
a . , d3 U(x) „ , vr,^^ d 2 [/(i(c)) ,d 2 i((c))precautionary savings enect even when |j ; = 0, since under ND1C — ' .; and
—
dc \
are both negative and hence the product is positive.
'J 7
which together imply that c has to be equal to 4 and that a < a. Under these
assumptions
dx(c)
dc
fix for c < c < c.
Therefore d \
' is increasing as long as c2 is between c < c2 < c, and constant
otherwise. We assume that at 7* the distribution of y 2 is such that c < c2 < c.
for all realizations of 6 . Then this will continue to be true for a small pertur-
bation in the distribution of y
2 and we can assume that xJc\?
'
= fix
2 (and
therefore DTC) everywhere in the relevant range. Moreover
dx3 (c)
_
dx2 {c)
dc3 ' dc2
-
as required by the condition of the Proposition.
Substituting this in the modified Euler equation gives us
6REe>{—±--8x2 (c(e>))} = U\x l )
x 2 (c{9))
or
{3SR = U'(x l )
In other words, the right hand side is now a constant: Shifts in the distribution
of y~ (mean-preserving or otherwise) have no effect on the decision to save as
long as c remains in the relevant range.
To complete the proof we need to show that U' and V' are convex. Now,
U(x) = \nx, so U'" > 0. V(z) has to be defined to generate the chosen x(c)
function:
V(z)= rU'(g(y))dy
Jo'0
where x = g(z) is the relationship between the optimizing values of x and z for
the same value of c. Therefore
V'(z) = U'(g(z))
V"[z) = U"(g(z)W(z)
V'"{z) U'"(g(z)){g'(z)} 2 + U"(g(z))g"(z)
Now since ^ = fix and ^ = 1 - fix,
g'(z) =
g"{~~) =
dx fix
~dz
~~ 1- fix
and
dx /3 fix
dz
=
[l- fix) 2 1 -/?
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Therefore
V'"{z 2 ) (x 2)^l-/3x2 '
1 g (3x
2
~(^2J2(l-/?X2 ) 2 l-/3l 2
/?
2
1
,
r[2
x2 (l - /3x2 )
2 L~ l-/3i2
This is positive in the relevant range as long as
1
<2.
1 - Px{c)
Moreover for <r outside the range [c,c] z is linear in x, and therefore V" has
the same sign as 27'". Therefore the condition for precautionary savings with
conventional preferences (that both U'" and V" are strictly positive) holds
everywhere. Yet there is no precautionary savings.
A few points about this result are worth emphasizing. First, the condition
that a; 1 (7) is differentiable is imposed for expositional purposes. Under NDTC,
we know that x l {^) is always continuous as a function of the underlying parame-
ters and therefore it is always possible to establish a variant of this proposition
for that case without any differentiability. Under DTC, we are only trying to
find a counterexample, and allowing for the possibility that x l (7) can be discon-
tinuous only makes easier to construct such an example. Second, the condition
that —
x
dc[ > is necessary to get the NDTC result. It is possible to construct
examples where —Zl < 0, and there is no precautionary savings even under
NDTC.
5.6 Implications for the Structure of Investments
Standard utility theory has some clear and useful implications about the nature
of investment demand. Specifically, it tells us that while the minimum scale of
a project is a consideration (because of credit constraints) , in addition to the
rate of return (we assume there is no risk), the maximum scale of investment
is not a consideration. You may not go all the way up to the maximum scale,
but the fact that there is a maximum scale is irrelevant as long as the project
has a high enough mean return. This is no longer necessarily true in our model
of temptations: Individuals facing declining temptations will be unwilling to
invest in high returns investments if the scale is too small. This captures the
lay intuition that investments may be unimportant unless they significantly
change one's circumstances.
Assume that the period one self has been offered access to a set of new
investment technologies (in addition to what was already available to him),
We are interested in whether he would take it up. These new investments are
described by three features. Assume that each investment l is described by its
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return R(i), minimum size s(l), and maximum size 5(t).30 If he undertakes
the investment t, he can choose an investment level I between s(i) and 5(t).
Period 1 self will then have / units less to spend but period 2 self will receive
R(l)I returns. In this highly abstract setup, we can examine the rank-ordering
of investments. If individuals are willing to undertake i what can we say about
any other t! that they would also be willing to undertake?
To analyze this rigorously we focus on a setting where both y
1 and y
2
are de-
terministic, borrowing is ruled out (allowing some borrowing would not change
anything essential, but makes some of the arguments more tedious) and there
is "base" investment technology, f{w l ) = Rqw 1 ,Rq > 1, The investor is now
offered the option of investing in one additional technology with the under-
standing that he still has the option of investing as much as he wants in the
base technology (subject, as before, to the constraint that he cannot borrow).
Proposition 7 In this setting under NDTC, if the investor is willing to un-
dertake an investment i = {R(i), s(l), S(l)} then he will always be willing to
undertake an investment l' = {R(l'), s(i'), 5(t')} as long as R(l') > R[l) and
s(l') < s(t). In other words, minimum scale and returns summarize the invest-
ment. In contrast, if S(l) > S(i'), under DTC there exist situations where this
is not true even if R{l') > R(i) and s(i') < s(t) .
Proof. Define W(cl ,c) to be the period 1 self's maximand, i.e.
Wx {£,<?) = W(c l ) + U{x 2 (c2 )).
In the NDTC, since x~ is a concave function of c2 , W l {c l ,c2 ) is a strictly
concave function of the vector (c l ,c2 ).
Suppose period 1 self's optimal choice when offered the option t is to invest
an amount I > in l and to consume an amount c 1 in period 1. The amount
he invests in the base technology is therefore y
1
— I — c 1 . Clearly in the absence
of credit y — I — c must be non-negative, c2 in this case is given by
c
2
= IR(L) + (y
1
-I-c l )R +y2
If instead he had chosen not to invest in t, he would have consumed an amount
c
1 in period 1 and invested y l — c 1 in the base technology. Therefore
22 = (y
1
- C
-
1 )i? +y 2 .
By the fact that the investor chose to invest
W{c\c2 ) >W(c\?)
Now consider the vector (Ac 1 + (1 - A)?1 , Ac2 + (1 - A)<r), 1 > A > : Clearly,
by the strict concavity of W, W{\c l + (1 - A)?, Ac2 + (1 - A)?) > W{c\ c2 ).
30 The model also has implications for the timing of investment which we do not investigate
in this current version.
30
The only constraint is whether (Ac 1 + (1 — X)cl , \c~ + (1 — A)c") is in the option
set. Note however that we can write
\c2 + (l-X)&
= \(IR{L) + {y
l
-I-c l )RQ +y2 )
+ (l-X)((y 1 -c l )R +y 2 )
= \JR{i) + {y l -XI -c 1 )R +y 2
In other words the investor can choose the vector (Ac 1 + (1 — A)cx , Ac2+ (1 — A)?)
by investing an amount XI in asset i. Now by investing an amount XI in asset J
with R(l') > R(t) the investor can generate a vector (Ac 1 + (1 - X)c l , XIR(l') +
(y
1
— XI — c 1 )Rq + y2 ), which has the same first element and a second element
which is no smaller than what he gets by investing XI in i. In other words,
W(Xc l + (1 - X)c\ XIR(l') + (y 1 -XI- c 1 )^ + 2/2 )
> WiXc 1 + (l-X)c\Xc2 + {l-X)?)
> W(c\-?).
In other words as long as we can make sure that the amount invested in asset \1
is feasible, i.e. set XI between s(l') and S(t'), then there will be investment in
i!
.
But since s(i') < s(t), it will always be possible to set A so that s(l') < XI <
S(l'). Therefore there will always be some investment in l! .
Under DTC, W(cx ,c2 ) is not necessarily concave. To see where things might
break down when W(c l ,c2 ) is not concave, consider the following special pref-
erences:
V(z) = az,z<c,
= ac, z > c
and
U{0) = 0, < U'(0) < a, U"{x) <
In the second period, these preferences imply that
z
2 (c2 ) = c
2
,z<c
= c,z>c.
Given these preferences, anyone with y} and y2 such that Roy
1 + y
2 < c, will
not save as long as the base technology is the only available technology, because
he faces a z'(c) of 1. Moreover, given that Rq > 1, y
1 must be less than c and
therefore period l's self will consume all of y
l in the form of the z good. His
two period utility is therefore ay 1 .
Next, assume that he is willing to invest the entire amount y in technology
i. This requires that
Riijy 1 +y 2 >c
that
SU(R(i)y 1 +y 2 -c)>ay 1 .
:;i
and that
SR{i)U'{R{i)y l +y 2 -c)>a.
Clearly we can find a R(l) large enough for which these conditions hold.
Finally assume that there is an i! such that R(l') > R(i), s(l') < s(i) and
S(i') < 5(t) . Now if
R(c')S(L')+y2 <c
there will obviously not be any investment in il ,even though it has a higher per
dollar return and lower minimum scale. The logic of this construction m.akes
clear that it can easily be extended to the case where both V and z (x ) are
differentiable functions.
This result is important, we feel, for two reasons. First, some of the high
return investments which have been brought up in the literature as instances of
a puzzling unwillingness to invest are naturally capped. Fertilizer, for example,
may earn very high rates of return (Duflo, Kremer and Robinson (2009)) and
has no obvious minimum scale but the maximum scale at which it can be applied
is capped by the amount of land you own. Similarly, Kremer, Lee and Robinson
(2009) argue convincingly that stocking behavior on phone cards is an example
of an unexploited high return investment, but once again these are investments
that are limited in terms of maximum scale: The optimal stocking pattern would
involve holding a few more cards, but not a lot more. Second, even when projects
have no natural maximum scale, the presence of credit constraints makes them
have one. Therefore, even if land is a constraint on how much the farmers
studied by Duflo, Kremer and Robinson (2009) invest in fertilizer, credit might
be: Farmers might prefer to consume everything they have, because given the
credit constraints, any interesting projects are beyond their reach. For both of
these reasons, empirical work on investment decisions should also pay attention
to the maximum feasible scale.
5.7 Demand for Credit
Declining temptations also have implications for the benefits and costs of credit.
In the traditional model, access to credit is clearly good: it increases the op-
portunity set. In models with self-control problems, credit can potentially hurt.
Specifically, today's self could be made worse off if tomorrow's self has access to
credit. This general feature of self-control models has more specific implications
if we focus on declining temptations.
To fully capture commitment benefits in this context, we need to introduce
a third ("zero") period. In the existing two period model, commitment has
benefits only if the first period can restrict the type of consumption (x goods
rather than z goods) in the second period. But in this section and those that
follow, we will be interested in what is effectively a much cruder commitment
mechanism: the restriction of overall level of consumption. In two periods, this
would be a meaningless concept since the second period self would consume all
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the wealth in any case. In a three period model, however, the zero period self
can undertake actions that restrict the first period self's ability to consume.
Since we are interested only in the investment and commitment demands of
this period zero self, we assume this self has no consumption. Instead he or she
merely maximizes U(x 1 ) + 5U(x2 ). 31 The other two periods are as before.
In this subsection, we focus on the case where the zero period self has a
single decision: whether or not to allow the period one self to have access to
consumption credit. The period 1 self has no automatic access to credit markets
but the period zero self may give him specific types of access. The point of credit
is to allow period 1 self to move consumption from period 2 to period 1; there
are investment opportunities or opportunities for lending. We are interested in
the types of access that the period zero self would be willing to allow his future
selves. Suppose that a loan A is defined by two characteristics: r(A), the interest
rate and a maximum loan size L(X). If the period one self is allowed a loan of
type A, he can choose to borrow some amount between and L(X) and have the
period two self repay r(A) times that amount.
We then ask question of the type: if the zero period self allows a loan of
type A, will he allow a loan of type A'? The key insight is that the shape of
temptation places structure on the demand for commitment. It is well-known
that the presence of temptations that cause the period 1 self to over-consume
would make the period zero self interested in placing a limit on how big the
maximum loan size L(X) can be. What is more surprising is that in the presence
of declining temptations the zero period self might have an additional interest
in placing limits on how small it can be.
Proposition 8 Under NDTC, if the period zero self is willing to allow a loan
A = {r(A), L(A)}, he will always willing to allow loan A = {r(X ),L(\ )} as long
as r(A) = r(A ) and L(A') < L(X). Under DTC there will exist situations where
he is willing to allow a loan A = (r(A),L(A)}, but not a loan A' = [r{X'),L(X )}
where r(A) = r{X'),but L(X') < L(X).
Proof. NDTC: In this case since x 1 (c 1 ) and x (c ) are both concave, Period
O's utility function
ITo(L) = U(x l {y l + Q) + SU(x 2 (y 2 - Lr(A))))
is concave as a function of L, the actual loan amount. Assume that period
self permits a loan product X — {r(A), L(A)}, but not a loan X' = (r(A ),L(X )}
where r(A) = r(X') = r,but L(X') = L' < L{X) = L.. This means that
n (Z) = U(x 1 (y l + L)) + 6U(x2 (y 2 -rL))
> U(x 1 (y l ))+SU(x 2 (y 2 )) = Tl (0)
31 In what follows, what matters is that the period self is effectively more patient than
period 1 self, so technically the period self could also maximize U(x 1 ) + cV(z l ) + S\U(x-) +
cV(z2 )] for some c > without changing our analysis in any signficant way.
;>,>,
but
IIo(Z') = U{x X {y l +L'-)) + 5U{x
2
{y
2
-rL'))
< U(x l (y l ))+6U(x 2 (y 2 )) = n (0)
where L,L' are the loan amount actually chosen under A, A'. ./Vow any Zoan
amount that is less than L' could have been chosen both under under A and
A . Therefore if L < L' , there is no reason why a decision maker who allows A
would be unwilling to allow A since L will be chosen under both. The interesting
case is where L > V > L' . In this easel! is between L and a loan size of 0.
But then, by the concavity ofUo(L), Ilo(L') has to be no less than IIo(O), which
directly contradicts what we said above. This contradiction proves that A' will
be allowed if A is allowed.
DTC: To show that this is not necessarily true in DTC, consider the example
from the previous sub-section where
V(z) = az,z<c,
= ac, z > c
and
U(0) = 0,0 < U'(0) <a,U"(x) <0
In the second period, these preferences imply that
z
2
(<?) = c\z<c
= c,z>c.
Also set r (A) = 1. Therefore
x
1 + z 1 + x2 + z2 = y
l
+ y
2
Assume thaty 1 = ac (0 < a < 1), y
2
= c + k and there is no borrowing allowed.
Call this scheme of (1,0) = Ao. Under this scheme, the period 1 self spends
his entire income on z while the period 2 self spends his first c on z but the
remaining k goes to x. Therefore Hq (Ao) = 5U (k)
Now assume that there exists a loan Aj = (1, L (Aj)), where L (Xi) < (1 — a) c <
k. For simplicity call this jc, j < 1 — a. Given the assumed preferences, the
period 1 self will want to borrow as much as he can and spend it all on z. The
period 2 self spends the k — 7c that remains after satisfying his appetite for z
on x. Hence Hq (A x ) = 6U (k - -yc) < 5U(k). Therefore, the period self does
not stand to benefit (and actually is hurt by) any loan with a maximal loan size
until the threshold of (I — a)c and will refuse all of those.
A necessary condition for any loan he would allow is therefore L(X) >
(1 — a) c. Assume L(Xo) = (1 — a)c + e. Now the period 1 self actually
spends an amount e on x because he can satiate his desire for z. Therefore
n (A 2 ) = U (e) + 6U (k ~ (1 - a) c - e)
.
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Now U' (e) > 5 [U (k) - U (k - (1 - a) c - e)\, for a sufficiently close to 1
since U is strictly concave. Therefore we have shown that there exists
Xo = (r(A2 ),/(A 2 ),L(A 2 )) and X x = (r(A 1 ),/(A 1 ) ,L(Ai))
with
r(A 1 )=r(A 2 ),/(A 1 ) = /(A,),L(A 1 )<L(A2 )
where period accepts A2 but not Ai .
The intuition behind this result is simple. When temptations are constant,
the only concern for the zero-period self is over-borrowing. Over-borrowing hurts
the period zero self in two ways: (i) Exaggerating the difference in consumption
between the period one and two selves and (ii) Engaging in borrowing at a higher
rate than the period zero self would want. 32 Self zero must weigh these costs
against the potential for borrowing to facilitate investments. As a result, person
zero can only want to limit the possibility for borrowing. When temptations
are declining, however, there is an offsetting force. When the period one self
borrows a small amount, all of it might go into z, but when he gets to borrow
more, declining temptations kick in and he spends more of the loan proceeds on
x.
33
These results, we feel, are helpful in helping us parse credit contracts that
we observe. Consider two different contracts: microfinance and credit cards.
Micro-finance offers only larger loans while credit cards only offer small loans.
In the model with constant temptations, and no lumpy investment, the period
zero self may accept to get a credit card but refuse a microfinance loan, but
never the other way around. Declining temptations can explain why we may
observe the opposite: resistance to credit cards (or the equivalent) while support
for micro-credit. 3435
Period zero self discounts at rate 5 while period one self discounts at (5(1 — z'{c)). Interest
rates between those two bounds would induce inefficient borrowing.
,l3 Given that the problem comes from 1 taking a small loan and spending it mainly on z it
might seem that putting a floor on loan size would achieve the same goal in this environment.
This is however not true: In this case a floor only matters if it is binding; if the period 1 self
wants to borrow less, then the period self would also want him to borrow less and would want
to lower the floor. A minimum loan size would help if, on the other hand, there were a lumpy
investment opportunity (or a consumer durable) that period 1 self could, in principle, carry
out, but even with the biggest available loan, carrying out the investment would require him to
consume less today. In that case, since he values consumption today relative to consumption
tomorrow more than the period zero self, he may be reluctant to carry it out even when period
zero would want him to. In this situation offering the option of borrowing a small amount
may not be in period zero's interest because period 1 is already overconsuming. On the other
hand, a larger loan is useful to 1 only if he complements it by saving more, which is what
wants. However the logic of this effect makes it clear that it would also arise in the constant
temptation case.
34 However it may be useful to add lumpy investment opportunities to our model since that
combined with time inconsistency would explain why micro-finance loans have a minimum
size.
35 We do not explore here a different commitment feature of debt: the forced repayment that
it implies. We conjecture that on this dimension as well, contracts which appear as micro-
finance contracts (big lump sum, combined with small repayment installments) help solve
35
5.8 Supply of Credit
So far we have focused on the demand side: We now turn to the supply side of
credit and investment opportunities. Consider an individual who is borrowing
from a monopolistic money lender. Suppose a new investment arises that earns
a rate of return higher than the money lender's cost of capital. If the money
lender could price discriminate and offer a rate specifically for this investment,
would the investment get made? Simple Coasian logic suggests it should. Yet
there is a long tradition of arguing that the money lender has an incentive to
block this investment either directly or by refusing to finance it, in order to
maintain his power over the borrower (Bhaduri 1973). The logic is that the
technological improvement will raise the earnings of those who used to borrow
from the money-lender which in turn hurts the lender's profits through reduced
borrowing. In short, the money-lender prefers to have his clients caught in a
debt trap.
Clearly, if the technological innovation were to change the time structure
of the borrower's earnings (so that his earnings become more present biased
and therefore his incentive to borrow goes down) the money lender has every
reason to feel threatened. However, as pointed out by Srinivasan (1994), if the
investment requires spending in the present to increase future earnings, there is
no reason why borrowing would go down and therefore the money lender should
want to promote the innovation.
In the rest of this sub-section we will see that while the intuition proposed in
the previous paragraph continues to hold under NDTC, the possibility of declin-
ing temptations reintroduces the possibility that Bhaduri had emphasized: The
money-lender may indeed want block progress to keep the borrower in his thrall.
Assume that there is a time-inconsistent agent, who, as in previous sub-
section, lives for 3 periods but consumes x goods and z goods only in the last
two periods. However the period self only values x consumption. Finally to
limit the number of free parameters assume both the borrower and the lender
do not discount future utilities, i.e., 8 = 1
The individual earns y in each of the last two periods and the period 1 self
has the option of saving at a gross interest rate of 1 and borrowing additional
resources from a money lender at an interest rate Ri set by the money lender.
Then the period 1 self will choose his borrowing L\ to maximize
Wiy + L^ + Uixiy-R^)).
Assume that this is maximized by choosing L\{Ri)
Suppose the agent borrows from a profit maximizing monopoly lender who
can only set the interest rate (i.e. he cannot set the amount borrowed as well)
and whose (gross) opportunity cost of capital is p > 1 per period. The lender
therefore chooses Ri to maximize (Li(Ri)Ri — pLi(Ri)). Let R° be the interest
rate that maximizes this expression. tt\ = (Li(i?°)i?J — pL\R\) is the maximized
level of profit
.
temptation problems more so than credit card like contracts (small trickles of borrowing,
combined with a big repayment).
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Now suppose an investment opportunity becomes available to the agent. It
requires an investment of / in period and an action taken in period 0, which
has a utility cost of E. The purpose of introducing this cost is to make sure that
the agent's lifetime earnings go strictly up if he undertakes the investment-in
other words, the interest rate the lender charges cannot be so high that the
agent ends up with the same income after the investment than he had before,
because in that case he would prefer not to put in the effort that the investment
requires. The investment, if undertaken, generates a revenue of (f>I in period 2.
Now given that the agent has no resources in period 0, the investment re-
quires a loan Lq = I in period 0. Suppose the money lender offers a loan of /
at interest rate Rq in period to be repaid when the investment pays off, i.e.
in period 2.
However knowing that he will be richer in period 2, the agent may want to
increase his consumption in period 1 by borrowing more from the money lender
(he may also want to do the opposite, which is to prepay the loan he had taken
out in period 0, but assume that the money-lender can block prepayment).
Consider the decision of how much to borrow in period 1. If the interest rate
set by the money lender in period 1 is Ri, the agent will maximize
W(y + Lx ) + U(x(y + (<(>- R )I - KLi))
which yields L\(Ro,Ri). Period takes this decision as given and chooses be-
tween investing and not investing: He invests if
U(y + L 1 (R ,R 1 )) + U(x(y + (<f> - R )I - R.L^Rq, Rj.))) - E
> U(;y + L l {R°l )) + U{x{y~R<{L l (R°l )))
The problem is interesting only if the investment is worth doing. As a feasibility
condition we assume that
U(y + Lx {p, RI)) + U(x(y + (0 - p
2 )I - flfZifo, fl£))) - E
> U(y + L^R*)) + U(x(y - flfZa(iJf)))
In other words, as long as the second period interest rate remains the same as
what, it is in the absence of investment, but the first period rate is set at the
(two period) cost of capital, the project is worth doing. A necessary condition
for this to be true is that tp > P
1
.
since E > 0. Note that this feasibility
condition is exactly the thought experiment at the beginning of the section: the
new technology is profitable relative to the money lender's cost of capital.
Under this feasibility condition, the lender always has the option of offering
the agent an interest rate p in period 0, and an interest rate R.° in period 1 and
getting him to do the project. He can also always block it by setting Rq = oo.
The following result establishes that he will never want to block under NDTC
but this is not true under DTC.
Proposition 9 In this setting under NDTC the moneylender will always be
willing to lend the investor money to make the new investment possible. Under
DTC there exist situations where this is not true.
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Proof. As noted above, under NDTC U{x(y + {</>- p2 )I - R°L 1 (p, R{))) is an
increasing and strictly concave function of y + (<p ~ P
2 )I ~ R°Li{p, R°), while
W(-) is always increasing and concave. We use this to first show that when
/ goes up from 0, keeping the interest rates unchanged, the borrower cannot
strictly prefer to borrow less.
Suppose, to the contrary, the borrower borrows L\ in period 1 when there
is investment / and L'
x
when there is no investment, and L[ > L\. By revealed
preference it must be that
W(y + Li) + U(x(y + (</; - p2 )I - R{L{))
> W(y + L[) + U(x(y + (t-p2)I-R°L[))
and
W(y + L'1 ) + U(x(y-R°L ,1 ))
> W{y + L 1 ) + U{x{y-RIL{))
It follows from these two inequalities that
U(x(y + (4>- P2 )I - RZLi)) - U(x(y + (</>- p
2 )I - R\L\))
> U{x{y-R°1L 1))-U{x{y-RIL'1 )).
Since 4> > P" , this contradicts the concavity of U(x(-)) unless
U(x(y + (0 - p 2 )I - R\L{]) - U(x(y + (</>- p2 )I - R°X L\))
= Uixiy-RlL^-Uixiy-RW).
which would imply that
W(y + L x ) + U(x(y + (</> - p2 )I - flJLj))
= Wiy + L'J+Uixiy+W-p^I-RlL',))
Therefore the agent cannot strictly prefer to borrow less.
Since the lender's revenue is
(R
-P2 )I + {R l - P)L l
This means that the lender can make himself at least as well off when there is
investment as when there is no investment, by setting Rq = p2 ,Ri = R° (our
feasibility condition guarantees that the borrower will invest when offered these
rates), since he gets to lend more (or at least no less). He will therefore lend
money to the borrower for investment.
To see what changes under DTC assume that
V{z) = az,z < c, a > 1
= ac, z > c
and
U(x) = x
38
Assume also that c > y. Therefore, in the absence of the investment, it is
always optimal for the period 1 self to borrow the full amount of y if he borrows
anything at all, since he gains nothing from leaving any amount less than c for
period 2 to consume. However period 1 does have the option of saving his period
1 income and spending it in period 2 - assume that the gross interest rate on
savings is 1. By borrowing and consuming everything, he gets a utility of
a[y+
-k ]
under the assumption that y + £- < c? 6 If he saves he gets
[2y - c]
This puts an upper bound on Ri implicitly given by
V_
Ri y
which only binds if
~
— y > 0. But since c > y and a > 1,
~ c
'
— y must
be negative, and therefore there is no constraint on how high i?i can be. A
monopolistic lender will set it to be infinite, and extract the borrower's entire
second period income, i.e., L\ ~ 0. Therefore the lender will earn an amount y
in this case.
If the investment does take place the borrower faces a similar choice: He can
either save his period 1 earnings and get utility 1y + (<f> - Rq)I— c in period 2,
in which case L\ = 0, and the lender makes no money from L\, though he may
still make money from the zero period loan. We will return to this option in a
few paragraphs.
The alternative for the lender is to make sure that the borrower borrows in
period 1. By the way the preferences have been specified, only the marginal
units of spending in period 2 go into x consumption, which is all that period 1
cares about. Moreover the marginal utility of x spending is constant. Therefore
if the period 1 self is prepared to move one unit of spending from period 2 to
period 1, he will want to do so for all the the other units of spending. In other
words, if he borrows at all, he will borrow the entire amount ' p 0|
Given that there is no x consumption in period 2, the only value from the
investment from the point of view of the period self comes from period 1
consumption of x. Therefore it must be the case that there is some period 1
consumption of x (otherwise the period self will never agree to put in the
effort). In other words, we must have
,
y + (4>-Ro)I ^_
V +
Ri
^
3c As we will show in the next few lines the solution to the monopolist's problem has fli = oo
and as a result this condition is implied by y < c.
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Therefore the utility period 1 self gets from consuming his entire discounted
income in period 1 has to be
y + (<fi-R )I
[y + 5 c] + ac.
Hi
To make him willing to borrow, it must be that
y + (<£- Ro)I
Ri
+ ac> y + {(p-R )I
Note that since Ri > 1, increasing Rq relaxes this constraint and makes it
possible to raise R\.
The lender's net earnings from Lq and L\ in this case are given by
IRQ -IP2 +y + (4>- Rq)I --^(y + (4>- Ro)I)
=
-Ip2 +y + (pI-^(y + ^-R )I).
For any fixed value of Ri, this expression is clearly increasing in Rq- Moreover
as observed above, raising Rq allows the lender to raise Ri. This gives the lender
a double incentive to raise i?o- However in setting Rq he has to consider period
zero's incentive constraint. Period zero will only put in the necessary effort in
this scenario if
iy +
y+{*- Ro)I
-n-E>o.
Hi
which tells us that
>c + E-y
ill
Using this in the expression for the lender's profits gives us the following upper
bound for the lender's profits
y + {4> - P
2 )I - p{c + E-y).
Can this be less than y, which was the lender's profit in the absence of invest-
ment? Clearly this depends on how large E can be, The constraint on E comes
from feasibility. Since R° = co, the agent does not borrow in period 1, and the
feasibility constraint is simply
2y + (cf)-p2)I-c-E>0
Suppose this constraint is only j.ust satisfied, so that
2y + {<p-p2 )I = c + E
Substituting this into the upper bound on the lender's profits, we get
c + E - y - p{c + E - y)
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which is negative. Clearly there is a range of values of parameters for which the
lender would never choose this option.
Finally consider the case where the lender gives up trying to lend in period
1 and simply tries to extract enough using Rq. In this case the lender's profit is
simply
(Ro-p2 )I.
The constraint on Rq comes from period zero's incentive constraint, which is
2y + {4>-R )I-c-E >
or
2y + 4>I-c-E > R I
Obviously in the case where the feasibility constraint is just satisfied, this re-
duces to the constraint Rol < pi. The lender makes no money. Hence he would
prefer to block the investment by setting i?o very high.
A simple corollary follows immediately from this the proof of this proposi-
tion:
Corollary 10 Suppose the investment does not cost any money i.e. I = 0.
However the money-lender can somehow block the agent's access to the invest-
ment (by using his political power for example). Under NDTC he will never
exercise this option. However under DTC there exist situations where he will
choose to block access to the investment.
6 Empirical Tests of the Model
The above propositions provide qualitative predictions. However, the model
also lends itself to a few specific quantitative tests. Here we outline how those
tests might work.
First, it may be possible to use observational data to test some of the as-
sumptions of the model. In particular, we could use exogenous income shocks
to look at which goods are the most income elastic and how the elasticities vary
for the rich and the poor. Then we can ask whether the goods for which the
income elasticities are systematically higher for the poor than for the rich are
the same goods that in surveys, people claim to want to give up.
Second, we can actually test whether temptation is in fact declining. To
do this, suppose there are several goods <?;. Suppose that each good has an
x component and a z component. Specifically, suppose that one unit of good
i provides Xi fraction of the non-temptation and z z fraction of the temptation
good. Moreover, suppose that what constitutes x and z goods is common across
individuals. 37 Now consider the following experiment. Suppose that we offer to
a set of individuals a choice between 1 unit of good i and d
x
units of good i in
one period. Assume, as is common in all discount rate experiments, that there
37 A weaker assumption that would still work is to assume there is a common component
with individuals varying in an iid way around this common component.
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is non-fungibility across time and goods so that individuals view this offer as a
genuine increase of either 1 unit today or a!;units,tomorrow. 38 Define di to be
the average di that makes individuals indifferent to this trade-off, i.e. half the
individuals choose 1 unit today and half choose d; units in one period. These
experiments allow us to array goods according to how much temptation they
provide. Goods that provide more temptation should show larger d{\ one would
need a large quantity in the future to induce one to give up one unit today. The
key assumption of our model can be empirically tested by looking at the Engel
curve for each good: declining temptations implies that the Engel curve should
be steeper for goods with lower di. Note that this is not mechanically true: The
Engel curve captures how demand for a particular good varies with income,
whereas di measures the discount rate associated with a particular good.
A final quantitative test of our model is based on our assertion that the
apparent patience difference between poor and rich is due to the composition of
consumption rather than genuine differences in patience. To test this, we would
offer trade-offs of 1 unit of money today versus rfm units tomorrow and use
this to back out an apparent discount rate for money 6m . We would then offer
(again, under the assumption of fungibility), 1 unit of an x good (identified as
above) today versus do units tomorrow. This allows us to back out an apparent
discount rate for x goods Sx . We then predict that ^ is declining in income:
the poor are much more impatient in money than in x goods and this gap closes
as income increases.
Note that these procedures do not just provide a test of the model. They
provide an important discipline to this approach. A key judgment needed to
operationalize this model is the identification of temptation goods. Such iden-
tification can be particularly difficult since there are often large inter-personal
differences in preferences. The above procedure provides a way to elicit an
individual's own judgments about what constitutes a temptation good. Such
judgments, we feel, will sometimes yield counterintuitive valuations. For exam-
ple, when Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2004) provide commitment savings accounts,
they ask individuals what they are saving up to buy. Since one would only save
up to buy x goods, it is interesting to see that the second most common stated
purpose for savings is festival and party expenditures. This might contrast with
our intuitive sense that the poor "waste" their money on these expenditures. 39
This example highlights the need for judicious use of experiments of the type
above to determine what is a temptation good and what is a genuine oasis of
pleasure.
38 This assumption is common in all discount rate experiments that are undertaken for
money, e.g. one dollar today or two dollars in one month. Such experiments are meaningless
if money were fungible in time for example.
39 Of course, to the extent that they generate a conspicuous consumption externality, there
can still be an argument for social waste.
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7 Conclusion
We feel that understanding the structure of temptations ("wasted expendi-
tures") is essential to understanding the lives of the poor. Our framework high-
lights one important structural feature of temptations: whether their impact is
declining in income. The results in this paper illustrate that declining temp-
tations can help to explain a large range of phenomena, from poverty traps to
credit and investment behavior. Though we do not focus on these issues in this
paper, they may also be helpful in answering a broader set of questions. First,
we mentioned briefly the idea that understanding the structure of temptation
may help in classifying and designing commitment savings products. Should
these products force savings or limit withdrawals? Should they put a ceiling on
withdrawals (so that there is always something left against emergencies or limit
withdrawals until a minimum amount is reached (so as to enable the accumu-
lation of a large lump sum)? We understand little empirically or theoretically
about these questions. Second, while our model focuses on expenditures, many
of the important choices of the poor are not fully captured by a pure expen-
diture focus. For example, the labor leisure choice is an important component
of overall income and wealth accumulation. Understanding how these choices
integrate into a temptation framework seems particularly important.Third, our
model generates a non-convexity in the second period utility function as viewed
from the perspective of the first period self. This might can provide a foundation
for the utility function proposed by Friedman and Savage (1948) to rationalize
the demand for lotteries among the poor. More generally the implications of
our framework for the relation between measured and actual risk aversion seem
potentially interesting and important. Finally, a deeper understanding of cer-
tain potentially addictive social behaviors, for example drinking and smoking,
have the potential to be interesting but would require a greater investment in
exploring the relation between the technology of addiction and aspects of the
shape of temptation emphasized here. While the present model makes some
progress, much interesting work remains to be done.
43
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Since t/'(x2 (c2 )) = V (~~ 2 (c2 )), and x 2 (c2 )+z 2 (c2 ) = <? , g = yn4SSU-))
and ^y = v^'f-^c^ii+c/"^^)) Taking derivatives and substituting the values
of ^ and f£ gives us
d?z2
_
(V") 2 U'" - (U"fW"
d{c2 ) 2
~ (U" + I/") 3
Now define H such that V{x 2 ) = V(z 2 (x 2 )) = H{U{x 2 )). Taking derivatives
and using the fact that ^ = ^gives us that
V'U"
Taking derivatives again gives us that
rr//,m l r U'V"(V'U"' + V"U"^) - V'U"(U'V'"$£ + U"V").H {u) =
IP 1 JjFv^ J-
Since V' = U' , this reduces to
H"W) = TTJJ
V i iy"YU"' - (U") 2V
V" 1 {U'V") 2
Since ([/" + V") 3 has the same sign as V" , the result follows.
8.2 A Derived Hyperbolic Model
To see the similarities, therefore, consider a T-period extension of our model.
Under assumptions that gave us (3), the intertemporal maximand for this case
can be written in the form
T
U(x l ) + V(z 1 ) + J2S tE{U(x t )}
6=1
Maximizing U(x) + V(z) subject to a budget constraint x + z = c, and the
conditions (x > 0,z > 0) gives us a function x(c).
U(c) = U(x(c))
and
V{c) = V{z{c))
Then the above expression becomes
T
Uic^ + Vic^ + J^^EiUic 1 )}
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a,
1 '-a
and
1 - a
A
Z
1-,
i
a
1 - Q 1
1-
When V'(c) = aU(c), this is the standard p-5 utility function with j3 = jx^-
One case where this condition holds is when
U(xt )
V(zt )
I — a
In other words two essentially identical CRRA functions: Under these assump-
tions, within period choice between x and z will give us zt = qx t where q = A« .
Substituting this into our maximand gives us
„1—a /_M—a„l-a _1— a
-•+£**?—
^^ 1 - a
1 — a L—' 1 — o
where /3 =
1
\ a , which is exactly in the hyperbolic form.
More generally, the models will be distinct, since they represent different
assumptions about temptation. The hyperbolic model focuses on disagreements
about the level of consumption whereas our model focuses on disagreements
about the composition of consumption. There are two ways to understand this
difference. First, we could start by assuming that our model is the more accurate
model of temptation-that temptation in fact occurs at the level of individual
goods. In this case, the hyperbolic model should be seen as a convenient ap-
proximation to the T-period version of our model and ft in those models is an
approximation to a more endogenously determined myopia factor (such as the
temptation tax in our model). Alternately we could start from the premise
that the hyperbolic model is the right framework but in utH space: individuals
value more utils today than the long-run self would want them to. Different
goods provide different time-profiles of hedonic flows. Hence some goods are
more tempting because they provide more present utils relative to the long-run
utils they provide. Our model then is a reduced form that abstracts from the
differential time-flow of utils. In this paper, we do not attempt to distinguish
between these alternative positions and simply work with our U(x) and V(z)
framework for the rest of the paper,
8.3 Generalizing the idea of the temptation good
So far we have operated on different preferences for two index goods. A more
realistic assumption would be that people have different preferences over a set
of goods. To get at this idea, denote by uF (xi, ..., ,i„) the utility function that
represents the preferences of the forward-looking self over any future outcomes,
and by uT {x\, ...,xn ) the utility of the current self over current outcomes; both
utility functions are now defined over the same set of goods. uT is where the
temptations come in (hence the superscript).
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Let xT (c) be the vector of goods that maximizes uT (xi, ...,xn ) subject to
n
£) Xi = c. Define wT (c) to be the indirect utility of the tempted utility function:
wT (c) — uT {xT (c)). Given this definition it is easy to write the maximization
problem of the forward-looking decision-maker as one of choosing (c l ,c) to
maximize
u
T (xT (c 1 )) + 5u
F (xT (c2 ))
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint. It is clear that the slope of the
up function relative to the slope of the of uT function plays a role similar to the
discount factor. We impose the assumption that this does not cause any bias
towards the future:
y. du
T
(
XJ(c)) dxf(c) y dUP (xf (c)) dxf (c)
^ ^ ^ &t—1 dx l dc ~ ^r1 Qxi dc
Note that both sides of this inequality are evaluated at the same value of c.
Assume for the sake of the exposition that the decision maker has a fixed
endowment y that he gets in the first period, no second period earnings, and
can lend at the rate r. Then the first order condition for this maximization
problem will be
^V)
= 3ry du p (xf(c2 )) dxj{c2 )
dc t-r1 dxi dc
It turns out that this decision maker would behave exactly like a U-V deci-
sion maker with appropriately chosen U and V functions. To see this, note that
this would require that the U(x) function and the x(c) function satisfy
U> [x { c
2
) ) x> { c
2
) = Y;
duP
ff))dxTd {f )
i
and
u'(x^)) =
dwT{cl)
dc
Putting these together gives us that x(c) needs to satisfy the differential
equation:
y^ du
p {xj(c)) dxl(c)
1/ \ ^i dxj dc
X (C)
~ dwT (c)
dc
which pins down x(c) if we impose the boundary condition x(0) = 0. x(c)
is clearly an increasing function and therefore has an inverse function c~ l (x).
Moreover since
dwT (C ) _ y duT {XT{c)) dxf(c) y, duP {xf(c)) dxf (c)
dc ^—' dx
z
dc ~ £—' dxi dc
by our above assumption, x'(c) < 1 for all c.
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And given c l (x), U(x) can be defined according to:
U\x) = ^{c-\x))
along with the boundary condition
1/(0) =wr {Q).
It is true that we have not yet defined V(z) but this is not an issue because
Proposition 8.3 below tells us that as long as x(c) is increasing and less than
or equal to c for all values of c (both properties that have already been verified
above for the x(c) function we constructed), 40 there is always an increasing and
concave V(z) function, such that maximizing U(x) + V(z) subject to x + z = c
will give us that particular x(c) function.
To summarize, the model where both selves care about all the goods (but
not to the same extent) is observationally equivalent to a model with U-V
preferences (as long as we only observe total expenditures in each period, as
opposed to the amount spent on each good), for an appropriate choice of U and
V. This ought to be intuitive: essentially, x captures the part of the expenditure
that aligns with what the forward-looking self wants, while z is the part that is
wasted from the forward-looking self's point of view, and it should not matter
that the wasted expenditure takes the form of excess spending on goods that
the forward-looking self also values (just not enough to justify that level of
spending).
An implication of this reformulation is that the same good may end up
being a temptation good in some contexts but not in others. For example, it is
not implausible that for some poor people, calorie-rich food is a necessity and
fancy exercise machines are temptation goods, while the reverse is true of some
wealthy and overweight people.
References
[1] Aleem, Irfan (1990). "Imperfect Information, Screening, and the Costs of
Informal Lending: A Study of a Rural Credit Market in Pakistan", World
Bank Economic Review, 4 (3): 329-349.
[2] Ashraf, Nava, Dean Karlan and Wesley Yin (2006). "Tying Odysseus to the
Mast: Evidence from a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines",
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121 (2): 635-672.
[3] Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo (2006). "The Economic Lives of the
Poor", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21 (1): 141-167.
[4] Banerjee, Abhijit and Andrew F. Newman (1993). "Occupational Choice
and the Process of Development", Journal of Political Economy, 101 (2):
274-298.
°x(c) < c follows from the fact that ^^ < 1 and x(0) = 0.
47
[5] Becker, Gary S and Casey Mulligan, (1994). "On the Endogenous Deter-
mination of Time Preference," mimeo, University of Chicago,
[6] Douglas Bernheim, Debraj Ray and Sevin Yeltekin, (1999), "Self Control,
Saving and the Low Asset Trap", mimeo, New York University.
[7] Bhaduri, Amit (1977). "On the formation of usurious interest rates in
backward agriculture", Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1 (4): 341-352.
[8] Collins, D., J. Morduch, S. Rutherford, and 0. Ruthven (2009). Portfolios
of the Poor: How the World's Poor Live on $2 a Day, Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
[9] de Mel, Suresh, David McKenzie and Christoper Woodruff (2008). "Re-
turns to Capital in Microenterprises: Evidence from a Field Experiment",
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123 (4): 1329-1372.
[10] Dreze, Jean, Peter Lanjouw, and Naresh Sharma (1997). "Credit in Rural
India: A Case Study", LSE STICERD Research Paper, DEDPS06.
[11] Dufio, Esther, Michael Kremer and Jonathan Robinson (2009). "Nudging
Farmers to Use Fertilizer: Evidence from Kenya", Working Paper.
[12] Fisher, Irving (1932). Booms and Depressions, Some First Principles, New
York: Adelphi Company.
[13] Friedman, Milton and Leonard Savage, (1948) " "Utility Analysis of
Choices Involving Risk" with Leonard Savage, 1948, Journal of Political
Economy Vol. 56, No. 4, Aug, pp. 279-304
[14] Fudenberg, Drew and David K. Levine (2006). "A Dual Self Model of
Impulse Control", American Economic Review, 96 (5): 1449-1476.
[15] Galor, Oded and Joseph Zeira (1993). "Income Distribution and Macro-
economics", Review of Economic Studies, 60: 35-52.
[16] Gruber, Jonathan and Botond Koszegi (2001). "Is Addiction "Rational"?
Theory and Evidence", Quarterly Journal Economics, 116 (4): 1261-1303.
[17] Gugerty, Mary K. (2007). "You Can't Save Alone: Commitment in Ro-
tating Savings and Credit Associations in Kenya", Economic Development
and Cultural Change, 55: 251-282.
[18] Harris, Christopher. and David Laibson (2001). "Dynamic Choices of Hy-
perbolic Consumers", Econometrica, 69 (4): 935-957.
[19] Karlan, Dean and Sendhil Mullainathan (2009). "Debt Cycles", Work in
Progress.
[20] Laibson, David (1997). "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting", Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 112 (2): 443-477.
48
[21] Lee, Jean, Michael Kremer and Jonathan Robinson (2009). "The Return to
Capital for Small Retailers in Kenya: Evidence from Inventories", Working
Paper.
[22] McClure, S. M., D. I. Laibson. G. Loewenstein and J. D. Cohen (2004).
"Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed Monetary Re-
wards", Science, 306 (5695): 503-507.
[23] Katherine L. Milkman, Todd Rogers, Max H. Bazerman (2010), I'll have
the ice cream soon and the vegetables later: A study of online grocery
purchases and order lead time, Marketing Letters 21(1), 17-36.
[24] Katherine L. Milkman, Todd Rogers, Max H. Bazerman (2009), Highbrow
films gather dust: Time-inconsistent preferences and online DVD rentals,
Management Science, 55(6), 1047-1059
[25] ODonoghue. Ted and Matthew Rabin (1999). "Doing it Now of Later",
American Economic Review, 89 (1): 103-124.
[26] O'Donoghue, Ted and Matthew Rabin (2006), "Optimal sin taxes", mimeo,
Cornell University.
[27] Ray, Debraj, (2002), "Aspirations, Poverty and Economic Change", mimeo,
New York University.
[28] Daniel Read; George Loewenstein; Shobana Kalyanaraman (1999), "A4ix-
ing virtue and vice: Combining the immediacy effect and the desire for
diversity", Journal of Behavioral Decision Making,12(4), 257-273.
[29] Skiba, Paige M. and Jeremy Tobacman (2007). "Measuring the Individual-
Level Effects of Access to Credit: Evidence from Payday Loans", Proceed-
ings Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, May: 280-301.
[30] Srinivasan, T. N. (1979). "Agricultural Backwardness Under Semi-
Feudalism," Economic Journal 89(354), June: 416-19
[31] Subramanian, Shankar and Angus Deaton (1996). "The Demand for Food
and Calories", Journal of Political Economy, 104 (1): 133-162.
[32] Thaler, Richard H. and H. M. Shefrin (1981). "An Economic Theory of
Self-Control", Journal of Political Economy, 89 (2): 392-406.
[33] Udry, Christopher and Santosh Anagol (2006). "The Return to Capital in
Ghana", American Economic Review, 96 (2): 388-393.
19

